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INTRODUCTION
Of the many recent changes in the legal-regulatory regimes
affecting financial institutions, the advent of stress testing as a
key regulatory tool deserves special attention on account of its
1
novelty and unique potential. To most Americans—and indeed,
1. See Chester S. Spatt, Regulatory Conflict: Market Integrity vs. Financial Stability, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 625, 627 (2010) (“One of the most interesting
innovations to emerge in the bank supervision model during the financial
market crisis is the use of stress tests.”); Patrick Jenkins & Brooke Masters,
Again Under Strain, FIN. TIMES, Jul. 8, 2011, at 7 (“[S]ince the financial crisis
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to most lawyers—the mention of a stress test likely prompts
thoughts of a visit to the cardiologist before it suggests any2
thing about the financial system. Those trained in engineering
will have a different view of stress testing in mind involving the
study of how physical objects such as bridges or airplane wings
respond to applied forces. The multitude of disciplinary contexts in which stress testing concepts have gained currency testifies to the general usefulness of stress as a diagnostic tool. For
those involved in financial markets, the appeal is intuitive: after an epochal series of stressed market events convulsed financial markets and systems at the end of the previous decade,
of course it is advisable for regulators and firms to spend more
time thinking about stress. However, this intuitive appeal presents a potential problem if, in their effort to incorporate stress
testing into regulatory regimes, lawmakers and regulators
overzealously clump together techniques and models of stress
testing without taking account of how they diverge in important ways.
In a broad and interdisciplinary sense, a stress test is any
analytic exercise designed to gauge how changes in variables,
usually of a dramatic or “stressed” nature, affect a test subject
in ways that are relevant to the subject’s performance, and in
particular its susceptibility to failure. Ultimately, the purpose
of any stress test is to gain familiarity with the means by which
those variables negatively impact the behavior of the test sub3
ject. In the financial area, stress tests can helps us to understand how an institution or system would respond to severe, yet
plausible, stressed market conditions such as low economic
output, high unemployment, stock market crashes, liquidity
. . . stress-testing [has] become a vital part of the regulatory arsenal.”).
2. Cardiology stress tests were frequently invoked by analogy after the
announcement that U.S. banking regulators would be conducting stress tests
at the 19 largest U.S. bank holding companies in connection with the Treasury’s Supervisory Capital Assessment Program. See Press Release, Timothy
Geithner, U.S. Treas. Sec’y, Secretary Geithner Introduces Financial Stability
Plan (Feb. 10, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press
-releases/Pages/tg18.aspx (“First, we’re going to require banking institutions
to go through a carefully designed comprehensive stress test, to use the medical term.”); David Wessel, Bank Checkup Also Tests Regulators, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 16, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB123983475012122683 (“In
medicine, a stress test is when the doctor puts you on a treadmill to check your
heart. . . . Today, the stress test the [U.S. regulators] are conducting at the nation’s largest banks is more than a test of the patients’ health. It is a test of
the government’s ability to restore confidence . . . .”).
3. See, e.g., AUGUSTO J. DURELLI, APPLIED STRESS ANALYSIS, at xii
(1967).
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shortages, high default rates, and failures of large counterpar4
ties. The results of stress tests shed light on the tension points
and weak links in portfolios and systems that could create ex5
traordinary but plausible losses.
Stress testing in the financial industry has been a key
component of financial firms’ internal risk management de6
partments for decades. What is new, however, is the zeal with
which lawmakers and regulators have looked to stress testing
as a regulatory technique. As lawmakers have increasingly
emphasized stress testing as a tool of bank regulation, they
have failed to elaborate several fundamental distinctions
among stress testing techniques and programs. Only with a
proper understanding of its purposes and limitations is a stress
testing regulatory program likely to prove an effective policy
tool.
Before presenting a normative case for how policymakers
should design the law and regulation of stress testing, this Article undertakes three descriptive tasks to better understand
the diverse set of techniques labeled as stress tests. First, it
briefly describes the origins of stress testing practices in the
engineering discipline as the study of how structures and systems experience failure. By placing stress tests in their historical and conceptual context, their purposes and promises should
become clearer. Second, it presents a rough typology of financial stress test techniques and discusses the distinctions among
them, highlighting in particular the extent of their reliance on
hands-on management involvement and the usage of quantitative statistical models that have come to predominate in financial risk management. Financial firm risk managers conduct a
varied array of exercises that fit the stress test label, including
sensitivity analysis, hypothetical scenario analysis, historical
simulation, “war game” direct event simulation, and “reverse”
stress tests. Regulators also conduct their own stress tests of
the financial system or individual institutions, either on an ad
hoc or periodic basis. Third, it surveys the law and regulation of
stress testing up to the present.
4. See Mathias Drehmann, Stress Tests: Objectives, Challenges and Modeling Choices, 2 SVERIGES RIKSBANK ECON. REV. 60, 63 (2008).
5. See PHILIPPE JORION, FINANCIAL RISK MANAGER HANDBOOK 266–68
(5th ed. 2009).
6. See, e.g., MICHEL CROUHY ET AL., RISK MANAGEMENT 232–40 (2001);
JAMES T. GLEASON, RISK: THE NEW MANAGEMENT IMPERATIVE IN FINANCE
190–93 (2000); GRP. OF THIRTY, DERIVATIVES: PRACTICE AND PRINCIPLES 11–
12 (1993); DAVID SHIRREFF, DEALING WITH FINANCIAL RISK 38 (2004).
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The Article also makes two theoretical contributions. First,
it develops an overarching distinction between two alternative
institutional orientations towards stress testing that has largely escaped scrutiny: assurance-oriented stress testing versus deliberation-oriented stress testing. These disparate orientations
characterize the corporate governance structures and firm attitudinal settings within which the different stress testing techniques, discussed above, are put to use. It goes on to argue that
the latter in particular holds great promise to counteract some
of the trenchant problems in contemporary finance. Second, it
presents a three-part framework, summarized below, to guide
efforts to implement a regulatory regime that encourages deliberation-oriented stress testing.
When using stress testing as an assurance tool, banks—or
regulators in coordination with banks—assume a partial equilibrium model of the financial system; privilege static scenarios;
draw from audit culture; rely on historical precedents in setting
scenarios; examine test variables in isolation; require precise
estimation; design tests with compliance and verification concerns in mind; and emphasize the communicative function of
the tests. A recent, salient example of assurance-oriented stress
testing was the highly publicized stress testing program conducted by the U.S. government in 2009, labeled the Supervisory
Capital Assessment Program (SCAP). The SCAP exercise subjected the nineteen largest U.S. bank holding companies to
stress tests designed to gauge likely losses through 2010 given
7
a “baseline” scenario and a “more adverse” scenario. This manifestation of stress testing receives the most attention from industry and commentators, but the familiarity of these uses of
stress tests disguises some of their limitations.
These limitations emerge most clearly when assuranceoriented stress testing is compared with the second, and more
promising, orientation towards stress testing, which I label deliberation-oriented stress testing. Deliberation-oriented stress
testing privileges dynamic scenarios; draws from business operations culture; relies on imagination; considers the interactivity of tested variables; remains open to uncertainty; and is motivated by governance concerns. In this manifestation, stress
7. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT: STRESS
TESTING AND SHORING UP BANK CAPITAL 10–26 (2009); Edmund L. Andrews &
Eric Dash, Government Offers Details of Bank Stress Test, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/26/business/economy/26banks.html.
For more on the SCAP stress tests, see infra Part IV.C.
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testing emerges less as a mechanical assurance tool and more
as an aspirational internal corporate governance norm. One recent example of a potential deliberation-oriented stress testing
initiative is subsection (i)(2) of section 165 of the Dodd-Frank
Act, which—without defining stress test or identifying the necessary parameters to stress—requires most banks subject to
8
U.S. banking regulation to conduct stress tests on their own.
The great promise of deliberation-oriented stress testing is
that it will foster a more mindful decisional infrastructure
within financial institutions and institutionalize the continuous
deliberation on failure, catastrophe, and stress. Given the roots
of stress testing in the engineer’s study of failure modes, it is a
ready conceptual fit in the context of the financial regulatory
regime, the primary objectives of which are (1) to prevent failures in core financial utility functions such as the payment system and the monetary policy transmission; and (2) to limit failures of individual institutions that result in recourse to
9
government safety nets. Because it affects the corporate governance infrastructure of financial institutions, deliberationoriented stress testing might facilitate regulatory efforts to
promote these regulatory objectives under conditions of increas10
ing uncertainty, volatility, and authentic complexity.
Conceptualizing stress testing regulation as a corporate
governance matter makes sense. Unlike the physical systems
with which engineers are concerned, financial professionals and
regulators must take into account human and organizational
decision making. And deliberation-oriented stress testing might
counteract decisional pathologies—such as the disqualification
8. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
§ 165(i), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1430 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365). The
mandate to conduct internal stress testing pursuant to subsection (i)(2) applies to (a) financial institutions designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) as systemically significant and (b) bank holding companies with assets in excess of $10 billion. See id. §§ 113, 165(i).
9. See RICHARD S. CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 53–61 (2009).
10. See generally Robert Weber, Structural Regulation as Antidote to
Complexity Capture, 4 AM. BUS. L.J. 643 (2012) (arguing that in many respects
contemporary financial systems are characterized by complexity rather than
mere complicatedness and discussing the implications); see also CHRISTINE
PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION AND DEMOCRACY 29 (2002) (“The experience of command and control shows that it is
not reasonable, practical or efficient for external legislatures and regulators to
be solely responsible for determining how organizations should manage social
issues. The design and enforcement of regulation to govern every potential social dilemma facing business is simply not achievable.”).
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heuristic, the outcome bias, the overconfidence bias, and the
hindsight bias—that inhibit organizational learning and unavoidably affect how capital is allocated throughout the firm. For
reasons discussed below, these tendencies often result in key
corporate decision makers overlooking accumulating evidence
of anomalies, overestimating the validity of their expectations,
and struggling to distinguish narrowly-avoided catastrophes
from outright successes. Psychologists have made further recent discoveries that people interpret near-miss events—that
is, narrowly avoided catastrophes—in ways that actually lower,
11
rather than heighten, their perceptions of risk. This troubling
finding suggests the counterintuitive result that narrowly
avoiding catastrophe makes us less likely to perceive our activities as risky and might even reduce our ability to engage in
learning. These decisional pathologies are prevalent in the context of financial firm governance, and are among the most severe threats to financial stability because they inhibit managers’ and board members’ ability to understand risk. The
enforced, mandatory deliberation on stress and failure might
serve as a partial antidote to the tendencies of corporate decision makers, whether individual or group-level, to overuse heuristics in dangerous ways and to normalize (rather than problematize) unexpected events that might be weak-signal
harbingers of future catastrophe.
Using public regulatory power to institutionalize deliberation-oriented stress testing within financial firms presents
unique challenges. The open-ended and indeterminate character of its outputs is a poor fit with existing conceptions of administrative law. This Article recommends a three-part framework to guide implementation of regulatory systems designed
to promote deliberation-oriented stress testing. First, regulators should understand their task as involving managementbased regulation—a regulatory approach that acts on corporate
planning processes rather than specific corporate actions or
12
outputs. Second, they should encourage the further development of the “quantitative skepticism” that Anette Mikes, in her
field research with bank risk management departments, has
11. See Robin L. Dillon & Catherine H. Tinsley, How Near-Misses Influence Decision Making Under Risk: A Missed Opportunity for Learning, 54
MGMT. SCI. 1425, 1436 (2008).
12. See Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation:
Prescribing Private Management To Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 691, 691 (2003).
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identified as one of two predominant calculative cultures within
13
large financial institutions. Deliberation-oriented stress testing will have an easier time gaining traction in a quantitatively
skeptical risk management department. Third, in their interactions with regulated firms, regulators should draw from the examples provided by so-called high-reliability organizations
(HROs) such as nuclear power plants, aircraft carriers, air traffic control systems, and wildfire-fighting units. Management
and organizational science scholars have lauded the ability of
HROs to maintain reliable, resilient performance even in condi14
tions of uncertainty and volatility. Put another way, the success of stress testing as a regulatory tool may well depend on
whether the regulated institutions implement HRO decision15
making norms throughout the enterprise.
The effort to build a more mindful decisional infrastructure
in the corporate governance of financial firms is at bottom
about building not only technical knowledge but also imaginative capabilities. The nature of this task recalls the recommendation of the so-called 9/11 Commission, charged with making
suggestions on how to avoid another catastrophic terrorist attack on major domestic infrastructure, that governmental
agencies “routiniz[e], even bureaucratiz[e], the exercise of im16
agination.” The corporate governance dimension of deliberation-oriented stress testing should be similarly conceptualized
13. For an extensive discussion of Mikes’s research, see infra notes 56–58,
377–87 and accompanying text.
14. See CONSTANCE PERIN, SHOULDERING RISKS: THE CULTURE OF CONTROL IN THE NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY, at ix (2005); JOSEPH V. REES, HOSTAGES OF EACH OTHER: THE TRANSFORMATION OF NUCLEAR SAFETY SINCE
THREE MILE ISLAND 123–50 (1994) (discussing learning from the experience of
Three Mile Island in the nuclear power sector); KARL E. WEICK & KATHLEEN
M. SUTCLIFFE, MANAGING THE UNEXPECTED: RESILIENT PERFORMANCE IN AN
AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 1 (2007); Jos A. Rijpma, From Deadlock to Dead End:
The Normal Accidents—High Reliability Debate Revisited, 11 J. CONTINGENCIES & CRISIS MGMT. 37, 37 (2003).
15. Of course, society almost assuredly has a lower risk tolerance for failure of a nuclear power plant than for a large bank or insurer. The point is not
that financial institutions are just like nuclear power plants; instead, the point
is that in both cases failure can impose externalities that justify a regulatory
intervention into the private ordering of corporate decision making.
16. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., FINAL REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED
STATES 344 (2004) [hereinafter 9-11 COMM’N REPORT], available at http://
www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf. Analogously, psychologist
Gary Klein has identified that successful firefighters have rich imaginative
lives. See GARY KLEIN, SOURCES OF POWER: HOW PEOPLE MAKE DECISIONS 1–
39 (1998).
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as an effort to cause financial firms to “expand [their] conception of the possible” in an effort to better understand the causal
environments, often characterized by uncertainty and volatili17
ty, that affect the achievement of firm objectives.
Part I of the Article briefly describes the origins of stress
testing practices in the engineering discipline. By placing them
in their historical and conceptual context, the purposes and
promises of stress testing should become clearer. Part II describes stress testing in the financial industry, situating such
techniques within a broader risk management framework of
which they form a part and introducing a taxonomy of the
prevalent techniques labeled as “stress tests” in finance. Part
III elaborates the distinction between assurance-oriented stress
testing and deliberation-oriented stress testing and argues that
the latter model holds more promise for promoting financial
stability. In so doing, it also presents four fictional case studies
to illustrate differences between these two orientations. Part IV
sets forth a brief history of the regulation of stress testing practices of financial institutions and finds that assurance-oriented
stress testing has, to date, predominated the field. Part V advocates in favor of the three-part framework—resting on the pillars of management-based regulation, quantitative skepticism,
and high-reliability organization principles—that will serve as
a useful guide for regulators to promote deliberation-oriented
stress testing.
I. ORIGINS OF STRESS TESTING AS THE ANALYSIS OF
FAILURE
What is a stress test? The details of the answer to that
question will depend on the discipline to which you direct the
question. Nevertheless, common conceptual threads run
through all applications of stress tests, the most obvious of
18
which is a focus on the causes of failure. When conducting the
test, the analyst applies forces to the test object, whether experimentally or analytically, up to or approaching some point of
failure in order to determine how the forces affect the test ob19
ject’s properties. Failure, as used in this context, should be
understood as the non-fulfillment of an objective, and therefore
17. Tony Jackson, Turning the Screw Back to 1973—Or Perhaps Further,
FIN. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2007, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/93d95d0e-9b7b-11dc
-8aad-0000779fd2ac.html.
18. See, e.g., DURELLI, supra note 3, at x–xii.
19. See, e.g., id.
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requires consideration of the test object’s purpose. Thus, a midflight fracture of an airplane wing would certainly constitute a
failure, but so too might a gradual deformation of the wing’s
edge due to shear stress that does not, at present, compromise
its ability to fly but which nevertheless could lead to an air disaster if left unrepaired. By better understanding the historical
genesis of stress testing methodologies, we can situate the contemporary uses of stress testing in financial regulation in their
conceptual context.
A. STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL ENGINEERING
This focus on how stress can lead to failure has deep roots
in the engineering discipline. The first stress tests were performed by the historical predecessors of structural and mechanical engineers, who sought to determine the strength of the ma20
terials they used to build structures. Nowadays, the term
stress connotes any “overpowering pressure of some adverse
21
force or influence.” When the term is used in financial regulation or legislation, this definition is intended. But for engineers,
stress has a specialized meaning as a measure of the “intensity
of the internally distributed forces or components of forces that
22
resist a change in the form of a body.”
Analysis of how things fail contributes to our understanding of how things work. Writing of the advances in scientific
knowledge during the Scientific Revolution, historian William
Rosen notes that “understanding didn’t progress by looking for
23
truth; it did so by looking for mistakes.” Henry Petroski, a
Duke University engineering professor, applies Rosen’s observation to his own discipline when he notes that “engineering
understanding did not progress by looking at successes; it did
24
so by looking at failures.” Petroski emphasizes how the engi20. See ARNOLD W. HENDRY, ELEMENTS OF EXPERIMENTAL STRESS ANALat vi (1964).
21. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 885 (2d ed. 1989) (defining
“stress”).
22. See HARMER E. DAVIS ET AL., THE TESTING OF ENGINEERING MATERIALS 17 (4th ed. 1982) (“In mechanical testing, as in the field of mechanics in
general, we attach rather specific meanings to certain terms, some of which
are interpreted more loosely in everyday life.”).
23. WILLIAM ROSEN, THE MOST POWERFUL IDEA IN THE WORLD: A STORY
OF STEAM, INDUSTRY, AND INVENTION 68 (2010).
24. HENRY PETROSKI, TO FORGIVE DESIGN 87 (2012) (also linking Rosen’s
observation to the Chinese proverb that “failure is the mother of success”); see
also Gene I. Rochlin, Informal Organisational Networking as a CrisisAvoidance Strategy: US Naval Flight Operations as a Case Study, 3 INDUS.
YSIS,
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neer’s preoccupation with failure enhances an understanding of
the causal environments within which structures, products, or
systems operate:
In all cases of surprise or failure, the greater technological tragedy is
not having failures but not learning the correct lessons from them.
Every failure is a revelation of ignorance, an accidental experiment, a
found set of data that contains clues that point back to causes and
further back to mistakes that might have been made in design, manufacture, and use. Not to follow the trail to its source is to abandon an
opportunity to understand better the nature of the technology and our
25
interaction with it.

For this reason, although engineers “are always striving
for success,” it is nevertheless “imperative that the realistic
prospect of failure be kept in the forefront of every engineer’s
26
mind.” As a result of this imperative, engineers are said to be
27
“always interested in the worst-case scenario.”
In the twentieth century, many branches of engineering
witnessed a methodological drift away from direct experimental
28
testing and towards theory and computer-based models. This
shift to analytical models and away from direct experimentation prompted intramural conflicts between those engineers
who preferred to focus on their computationally sophisticated
model simulations and those who emphasized instead the need
for experimental data to verify the model and, more importantly, understand better the causal environment—or, in other
CRISIS QUART. 159, 170 (1989) (“It is said in the Navy that every lesson is
‘written in the blood of failures.’”).
25. PETROSKI, supra note 24, at 45.
26. Id. at 175, 198 (also noting that “failure is seldom far from [engineers’]
minds”).
27. IZURU TAKEWAKIET ET AL., IMPROVING THE EARTHQUAKE RESILIENCE
OF BUILDINGS: THE WORST CASE APPROACH 1 (2013).
28. See, e.g., JOSEF SINGER ET AL., BUCKLING EXPERIMENTS: EXPERIMENTAL METHODS IN BUCKLING OF THIN-WALLED STRUCTURES 3 (1998);
Wolfgang G. Knauss, Perspectives in Experimental Solid Mechanics, 37 INT’L
J. SOLIDS & STRUCTURES 251, 256 (2000). Direct experimentation permits an
analyst to determine with a high degree of certainty the stress distribution in
a system or machine component in actual operation without needing to know
with the same degree of certainty the exact nature of the forces acting on the
part of system. See MIKLÓS HETÉNYI, HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL STRESS
ANALYSIS, at v (1950). On the other hand, it sacrifices somewhat the ability to
individuate the precise causal impact of each contributing force on the tested
subject. See HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL SOLID MECHANICS, at v (William N.
Sharpe, Jr. ed., 2008); HETÉNYI, supra at v. Where it is impossible to experiment directly on a test subject, a stress analyst will often construct a smaller
model and conduct tests based on assumptions regarding the relationship between the scaled model and the full sized construction it represents. See
HENDRY, supra note 20, at 1.
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words, the relevant model parameters—on which the model’s
29
structure should depend. These debates presaged later conflicts in other fields, including finance, about the relative virtues and shortcomings of computer-driven analytical models
and direct experiments. The point here is that engineering,
with its demands to understand how causes can trigger failure
in the real world, could not afford to sidestep this debate. Analytical theory, along with the computer technologies that facilitated its rise, came to co-exist with hard-nosed experimenta30
tion.
One particular analytical modeling method—the so-called
Monte Carlo method—is used extensively by engineers and financial risk managers, and accordingly bears special mention
31
in this context. Monte Carlo methods model a system or structure mathematically, but randomly generate values in a series
of simulations for the relevant variables that affect the outputs
32
of interests to the analyst. As a result, Monte Carlo simula29. See SINGER ET AL., supra note 28, at 5 (“New phenomena have still to
be found and properly understood in physical tests, before even the powerful
computers of today can give a reliable simulation and then extend the range of
parameters.”); Bruce G. Johnston, Buckling Behavior Above the Tangent Modulus Load, 128 TRANSACTIONS AM. SOC’Y CIVIL ENG’RS 819, 820 (1963) (“There
are many advantages in simulated tests, carried out with the aid of a computer, in comparison with real tests in an actual testing machine. No machining
is involved, no materials need be acquired, and there is no scatter in the test
results!”); Knauss, supra note 28, at 256–57 (comparing over-reliance on analytical computer models over experimental methods to “aspects of the scholasticism during the 13th century, which fathered the far reaching philosophical
innovations by Roger Bacon”).
30. See HUGH W. COLEMAN & W. GLENN STEELE, EXPERIMENTATION, VALIDATION, AND UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS FOR ENGINEERS 2 (3d ed. 2009) (“Experimental information is almost always required at one or more stages of the
[analytical] solution process, even when an analytical approach is used. Sometimes experimental results are necessary before realistic assumptions and
idealizations can be made so that a mathematical model of the real-world process can be formulated using the basic laws of physics. In addition, experimentally determined information is generally present in the form of physical property values and the auxiliary equations . . . necessary for obtaining a
solution.”).
31. Monte Carlo simulations are so named because the method of generating random numbers resembles a “roulette-like machine of the kind utilized in
the gambling Casinos of the Monte Carlo Principate.” ENRICO ZIO, THE MONTE
CARLO SIMULATION METHOD FOR SYSTEM RELIABILITY AND RISK ANALYSIS 1
(2013). A late nineteenth century mathematician named John William Strutt
Rayleigh invented basic Monte Carlo modeling techniques under the name
“random walks.” See DIMITRIS N. CHORAFAS, RISK MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGY IN FINANCIAL SERVICES: RISK CONTROL, STRESS TESTING, MODELS, AND IT
SYSTEMS AND STRUCTURES 145 (2007).
32. See DOUGLAS W. HUBBARD, THE FAILURE OF RISK MANAGEMENT: WHY
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tion models generate probabilistic assessments of system failures even before any particular failure has occurred as an operational matter. Recalling Petroski’s maxim that engineers
33
learn from failure, Monte Carlo methods permit engineers to
simulate failures with computers and learn from them before
they ever happen.
B. SYSTEMS RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
While stress analysis has its roots in mechanical and structural engineering, its utility became apparent to other engineers as well. In the second half of the twentieth century, engineers developed a new branch of their discipline known as
“systems reliability analysis” (SRA). SRA is inspired by the
concept of reliability, which is tied to the concept of failure that
undergirds all stress analysis. When used in this context, reliability is a statistical concept describing the probability that a
system will not experience failure during a specified time peri34
od under given operating conditions. The SRA engineer’s job
is to identify potential sources of failure and design the system
35
to avoid those failures. SRA engineers utilize visual diagrams
and logic models known as fault trees and event trees to assist
them in modeling the ways in which system failures can occur,
particularly when engineering complicated systems such as nuclear power plants, transportation infrastructure systems, missile defense systems, resource extraction projects, space travel
36
expeditions, and robotics. SRA can be seen as a precursor to
stress testing in the financial regulatory context because it con37
templates human judgment as a source of system failure. In
this respect it is more readily adopted as a prototype for reguIT’S BROKEN AND HOW TO FIX IT 60–63 (2007).
33. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
34. See DEP’T OF DEF., HANDBOOK ON RELIABILITY GROWTH MANAGEMENT 2 (2011); BALBIR S. DHILLON, RELIABILITY ENGINEERING IN SYSTEMS
DESIGN AND OPERATION 5 (1983); ERNST G. FRANKEL, SYSTEMS RELIABILITY
AND RISK ANALYSIS 11–12 (1988); PATRICK D.T. O’CONNOR, RELIABILITY ENGINEERING 1 (1988).
35. MARVIN RAUSAND & ARNLJOT HØYLAND, SYSTEM RELIABILITY THEORY: MODELS, STATISTICAL METHODS, AND APPLICATIONS 73 (2004).
36. See RAUSAND & HØYLAND, supra note 35, at 96–124; Clifton A. Ericson II, Fault Tree Analysis—A History, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH INT’L
SYS. SAFETY CONF. 1 (1999), available at http://www.fault-tree.net/papers/
ericson-fta-history.pdf (“The fundamental concept of Fault Tree Analysis is the
translation of the failure behavior of a physical system into a visual diagram
and logic model.”).
37. See RAUSAND & HØYLAND, supra note 35, at 69.
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lating corporate entities.
Though materials stress testing and SRA methods trace
their origins to the engineering discipline, the concept is by no
means limited to that context; after all, perhaps the most widely recognized stress testing application comes from cardiology,
where a stress test consists of induced cardiovascular stress
through exercise or pharmacological agents followed by imaging. The stress test’s purpose is to progressively overload the
cardiovascular system in order to reveal abnormalities not pre38
sent at rest. It is a “focal point in the diagnosis and prognosis
39
of cardiovascular disease.” And cardiology is just one salient
example. The relevant scope of stress testing as a technique is
as wide as the range of structures, materials, or systems that
impact any matter of societal import—from the cardiovascular
health of a single individual to citywide transportation systems
and power plants. And stress analysis also applies, as explained below, to the financial system and the institutions that
transact in it.
II. HOW DO STRESS TESTS WORK IN FINANCE?
A. WHY STRESS IS A PROMISING REGULATORY TOOL
The paramount concern of financial regulators is financial
failure—i.e., the insolvency of an institution or the inability of a
40
financial market to perform reliably and consistently. Regulators are charged with curbing failure on both institutional and
41
systemic levels. Their supervisory duties consist primarily of
minimizing institutional failures in order to limit recourse to
government guarantees (e.g., deposit insurance, state insurance guaranty funds) that are only partially recouped through
ex post assessments on other institutions. Their system-wide
regulatory duties consist primarily of preventing the break38. ROBERT S. ELIOT, STRESS AND THE
MENTS, MANAGEMENT 105 (1988).

HEART: MECHANISMS, MEASURE-

39. David Akinpelu, Treadmill Stress Testing, MEDSCAPE, http://
emedicine.medscape.com/article/1827089-overview (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).
40. See Jean Pierre Sabourin, The Deposit Insurer’s Role in Maintaining
Financial Stability, in SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES: RESOLVING LARGE BANK
INSOLVENCIES 59, 59 (Douglas D. Evanoff & George G. Kaufman eds., 2005)
(“Dealing effectively with systemic financial crises and the resolution of large
bank insolvencies has always been an important subject for those working in
the financial system safety net. But, it is becoming even more critical in a
world of ever greater consolidation and globalization in financial services.”).
41. Id. at 61.
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down in key financial functions such as the payments system,
the monetary policy transmission mechanism, and savings
transformation. A separate, but related danger against which
regulators guard is the possibility that institutional or market
failures ramify throughout the interconnected financial system,
causing further failures with attendant system instabilities and
losses to government guarantees.
Outside of an actually experienced failure, stress testing
practices comprise the settings where corporate managers and
boards engage most directly with the concept of failure. On account of that preoccupation with failure, it is hardly surprising
that regulators have adopted stress tests and stress analysis as
regulatory tools. If anything, it is surprising that it took them
so long. Nuclear engineers conduct stress tests and other SRAtype exercises in order to ensure (1) the reliable delivery of
electricity, on which businesses, households, and transportation systems depend; and (2) the avoidance of accidents, on
42
which the environment depends. Financial institutions play
analogous roles and present similar risks in the economic context. Their critical roles in facilitating payment systems, savings intermediation, and monetary policy transmission comprise the grid through which finance flows and commerce is
enabled. And the consequences of a financial crisis can devastate the wider economy, much like the catastrophic effects of a
nuclear reactor incident on the surrounding environment.
B. STRESS TESTS ARE A KEY COMPONENT OF EXISTING RISK
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
Over the past three decades, stress testing techniques have
become an integral part of the risk management infrastructure
of a typical financial firm. In the late 1980s and 1990s, most financial firms developed systems of risk management to respond to increased exposures to market, credit, and operational
risks on account of the proliferation of derivatives during the
43
same period. From a corporate governance perspective, this
revolution in risk management reflected the board of director’s
42. Cf. Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, http://
www.world-nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-Security/Safety-of-Plants/Safety-of
-Nuclear-Power-Reactors/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2014) (discussing the implementation of stress tests to prevent accidents, as well as the importance of reliability).
43. See Robert F. Weber, An Alternative Story of the Law and Regulation
of Risk Management, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1005, 1020 (2013).
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responsibility to set corporate risk policy and management’s
44
delegated responsibility to put that policy into action. Though
the initial impetus to develop risk management systems originated in the private sector, public bank regulators quickly perceived that their ability to achieve their statutory mandates of
institution-level safety and soundness and system-wide financial stability increasingly came to depend on the effectiveness
of those systems. Accordingly, one of the key themes of bank
supervision from the late 1980s to today is the redirection of
supervisory resources towards fostering robust risk manage45
ment systems within banks. The use of stress testing as a
46
regulatory technique forms part of this effort.
1. Brief Introduction to Risk Management Systems
At its most fundamental level, risk management is about
identifying bad outcomes that could occur in an uncertain future and taking deliberate action to shift the odds in a firm’s
47
favor. Risk management thus comprises risk assessment and
48
risk control. The risk assessment process requires considera-

44. Id. at 1044.
45. See Lessons Learned in Risk Management Oversight at Federal Financial Regulators: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, and
Investment of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th
Cong. 9 (2009) (statement of Timothy W. Long, Senior Deputy Comptroller,
Bank Supervision Policy and Chief National Bank Examiner, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency), [hereinafter Long Statement], available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg52966/pdf/CHRG-111shrg52966
.pdf (“Risk management is a key focus of our large bank supervision program.”); DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION 274 (2008) (noting that because the “risks associated with the complexity and pace of large bank activities cannot be
effectively contained even with sophisticated rules . . . the emphasis increasingly has been on fostering robust risk management systems within the banks
themselves”); Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Govs. of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks at the Stonier Graduate School of Banking, Washington, D.C. (June
12, 2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
bernanke20060612a.htm (characterizing regulators’ “assessment of the quality
of a bank’s procedures for evaluating, monitoring, and managing risk” as the
“heart of the modern bank examination”).
46. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND
STRESS TESTING PRACTICES AND SUPERVISION 5 (2009) [hereinafter BCBS,
STRESS TESTING PRINCIPLES], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs155
.pdf.
47. See DAN BORGE, THE BOOK OF RISK 4 (2001).
48. Cf. PHILIPPE JORION, VALUE AT RISK: THE NEW BENCHMARK FOR
MANAGING FINANCIAL RISK 3 (2d ed. 2001) (“Risk management is the process
by which various risk exposures are identified, measured, and controlled.”).
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49

tion of a firm’s objectives. The risk assessment process re50
quires consideration of a firm’s objectives. A risk to be controlled, and therefore “managed,” is one that impacts the
achievement of those objectives. One risk manager explains
that the “Holy Grail of risk management” is “to find the best
51
possible decision to make when faced with uncertainty.”
This conception of risk presents a subtle contrast with other definitions of risk that use risk as a measure of volatility
52
alone. While the volatility of asset returns and interest rates
is obviously relevant to a financial institution, I argue that risk
management, properly conceived, should not equate risk with
volatility alone. The idea that risk connotes volatility dates
from 1921, when economist Frank Knight distinguished uncertainty from risk on the grounds that latter was measurable and
53
the former was not. This Knightian definition of risk has an
impressive legacy, but it is inadequate to describe risk management for two reasons.
First, it is too broad because it includes all uncertain future events that are capable of probabilistic measurement. Risk
management, however, is only concerned with uncertainty to
54
the extent it might impact organizational objectives. It would
be absurd to talk about the meanderings of an ant as risky until someone wagered a bet on the next movement. Second, it is
in another respect too narrow because risk management is concerned with unmeasurable uncertainty as well. In finance it is
a commonplace to use risk to refer to the variance of returns
from the expected return—a definition that is measured quan-

49. See David Garland, The Rise of Risk, in RISK AND MORALITY 48, 50–51
(Richard V. Ericson & Aaron Doyle eds., 2003); Ian Hacking, Risk and Dirt, in
RISK AND MORALITY, supra at 21, 22.
50. See Garland, supra note 49, at 50–51; Hacking, supra note 49, at 22.
51. BORGE, supra note 47, at 12.
52. Risk and uncertainty are contested terms even within the risk management field. HUBBARD, supra note 32, at 79 (“Concepts about risk and even
the word risk are a source of considerable confusion even among those who
specialize in the topic.”).
53. See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 233 (1921)
(“To preserve the distinction between the measurable uncertainty and an unmeasurable one we may use the term ‘risk’ to designate the former and the
term ‘uncertainty’ for the latter.”).
54. See HUBBARD, supra note 32, at 81–84; Glyn A. Holton, Defining Risk,
60(6) FIN. ANALYSTS J. 19, 21 (2004) (“According to common usage, risk entails
both uncertainty and exposure—possible consequences. Knight’s distinction
addresses only the uncertainty.”).
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55

titatively. In her revealing research performed while embedded in bank risk management departments, Anette Mikes
found evidence of two prevailing “calculative culture” types
within risk management departments: quantitative enthusi56
asm and quantitative skepticism. Mikes found that while all
the risk management departments she examined made extensive use of quantitative information and statistical techniques,
the quantitative skeptics considered risk measurements only as
trend indicators to be taken into consideration alongside other
qualitative criteria such as “managerial discretion, experience
57
and judgment.” Quantitative skeptics regard quantitative risk
58
measurement tools as “learning machines.” And yet a
Knightian definition of risk would fail to include such information.
2. Brief Introduction to Value-at-Risk, a Building Block of
Risk Management Systems
The idea of value-at-risk (VaR) connects the general concept of risk management to the concrete practices of stress testing at financial institutions. VaR models can be thought of as
the basic building blocks of risk measurement and they also
comprise the operational settings within which most financial
59
stress tests are conducted. VaR is an expression of the amount
60
of possible loss to which a financial firm is exposed. One risk
management commentator refers to VaR as the “holy grail of

55. See Robert T. Miller, Oversight Liability for Risk-Management Failures at Financial Firms, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 59–60 (2010).
56. Anette Mikes, Risk Management and Calculative Cultures, 20(1)
MGM’T ACCOUNTING RES. 18, 22 (2009).
57. Anette Mikes, Chief Risk Officers at Crunch Time: Compliance Champions or Business Partners, 2 J. RISK MGM’T FIN. INSTITUTIONS 7, 15 (2008).
58. Mikes, supra note 56, at 27.
59. COMM. ON THE GLOBAL FIN. SYS., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS,
STRESS TESTING AT MAJOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: SURVEY RESULTS AND
PRACTICE 3 (2005) [hereinafter BIS, STRESS TESTING PAPER]. But see Robert
F. Weber, The Corporate Governance Case for Deliberation-Oriented Stress
Testing Regulation, 39 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2014) (describing “expected
shortfall” risk measurement techniques as an alternative to VaR).
60. A comprehensive definition of VaR would disaggregate the term into
the most direct meaning expressed above in the text and also the VaR “procedures” by which the VaR amount is generated, the statistical VaR “methods”
utilized in the VaR procedures employed by the firm, and the VaR “approach”
to risk management with its concomitant enthusiasm for risk quantification.
See KEVIN DOWD, BEYOND VALUE AT RISK: THE NEW SCIENCE OF RISK MANAGEMENT 21 (1998).
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61

risk management.” From the inception of VaR methods, risk
managers self-consciously designed VaR methods in a manner
to facilitate a new deliberative discourse among corporate
stakeholder on how risk permeates across a financial firm:
“Subject to the simplifying assumptions used in its calculation,
[VaR] aggregates all of the risks in a portfolio into a single
number suitable for used in the boardroom, reporting to regula62
tors, or disclosure in an annual report.” Some risk management commentators saw in VaR the potential for an aspirational overhaul of corporate governance to a new rationalized,
quantitative approach to managing not only risk but the entire
63
firm.
Risk managers express VaR as the maximum expected loss
a firm will face within a specified probability level (known as
the “confidence level”) over a particular time period (known as
64
the “time horizon”). The VaR model allows risk managers to
make the following statement: “We are X percent certain that
65
we will not lose more than V dollars in the next N days.” The
most common variant of VaR methodology by far is historical
66
simulation, which consists of a computational phase and an
interpretive-planning phase.
In the computational phase, the firm takes its current assets and liabilities and revalues them on the basis of daily historical values for relevant risk factors (e.g., interest rates, exchange rates) and prices over a predetermined look-back
67
period, most typically 500 days. This is essentially a counter61. LINDA ALLEN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING MARKET, CREDIT, AND OPERARISK: THE VALUE AT RISK APPROACH 3 (2004) (“[M]arket forces during
the late 1990s created conditions that led to the evolution of VaR as a dominant risk measurement tool for financial firms.”); JORION, supra note 48, at
xxi; cf. note 51 and accompanying text.
62. Thomas J. Linsmeier & Neil D. Pearson, Value at Risk, 56 FIN. ANAL.
J. 47, 48 (2000).
63. See DOWD, supra note 60, at 20–22.
64. CROUHY ET AL., supra note 6, at 187; DOWD, supra note 60, at 39.
65. JOHN C. HULL, RISK MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 196
(2007).
66. See Christophe Pérignon & Daniel R. Smith, The Level and Quality of
Value-at-Risk Disclosure by Commercial Banks, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 362,
367–70 (2010) (finding that 73% of large international banks that disclose
their VaR methodologies, a group that itself comprises 65% of all such banks,
use historical simulation methods).
67. See JAMES GLEASON, RISK 187 (2000) (“In a nutshell, you run your
daily [profit and loss] process over and over again, using the history of past
daily market price moves.”). For assets traded on markets, risk managers can
simply plug in the appropriate historical prices. For untraded assets, risk
TIONAL
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factual exercise: “assuming we had this portfolio yesterday, and
the day before yesterday, and so forth, what would our net prof68
it-loss position have been?” When the firm has valued its assets and liabilities over the relevant time horizons comprising
the look-back period, it ranks the net profit-loss outcomes from
69
worst to best.
In the interpretive-planning phase, risk managers decide
on the applicable confidence level. If the confidence level is, say,
five percent, they will look to the fifth percentile of outcomes—
thus, if the look-back period is 500 days then the fifth percen70
tile would be the twenty-fifth worst net profit-loss outcome.
The difference between current market values of the portfolio
and this fifth percentile is then interpreted as the “value” that
71
is “at risk” over the next day. A higher confidence level will
result in a higher VaR number—e.g., if the confidence level is
99% instead of 95% then the value at risk will be the difference
between current market values and the fifth worst net profitloss outcome.
As thus described, the term “value-at-risk” is a misnomer.
Of course, the “value” that is “at risk,” as a layperson under72
stands the term, is always the entire portfolio. In fact, VaR
really tells you what you should expect to lose a few times a
73
year. One risk management text summarizes this point:
[VaR] is not the answer to the simple question: How much can I lose
on my portfolio over a given period of time? The answer to this question is “everything,” or almost the entire value of the portfolio! . . . Instead, [VaR] offers a probability statement about the potential change

managers must construct a pricing model that specifies how the identified risk
factors affect the asset’s value.
68. JORION, supra note 48, at 221 (observing that historical VaR methods
do not “represent an actual portfolio but rather reconstruct[] the history of a
hypothetical portfolio using the current position”). If the time horizon is longer
—say, 10 days—then risk managers make appropriate adjustments. Specifically, they typically assume that the VaR estimate for a time horizon consisting of N days is equal to the product of the 1-day VaR estimate times √N. See
ALLEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 7 (referring to this method as the “square root
rule”); HULL, supra note 65, at 203.
69. See Miller, supra note 55, at 63.
70. See DOWD, supra note 60, at 39.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 40 (noting that such a measure “is not very informative”).
73. See Jón Daníelsson, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Limits to Risk
Modeling, 26 J. BANKING & FIN. 1273, 1275 (2002) (noting that VaR “is only
concerned with the 99% loss level, or a loss which happens 2.5 times a year,
implying that VaR violations have very little relevance to the probability of
bankruptcy, financial crashes, or systemic failures”).
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in the value of a portfolio resulting from a change in market factors,
over a specified period of time. [VaR] is the answer to the following
question: What is the maximum loss over a given period such that
there is a low probability, say a 1 percent probability, that the actual
74
loss over the given period will be larger?

VaR techniques are a linchpin of all risk management systems, whether the departments operating those systems are
staffed with quantitative enthusiasts or quantitative skeptics.
Even putting aside the inherent arbitrariness with selecting a time horizon and confidence level, there are technical limitations of the VaR techniques themselves. These limitations
are well-documented and, at the risk of venturing into welltrodden territory—particularly after the recent financial crisis
—three brief points regarding VaR’s limitations are helpful in
order to better understand the utility of stress testing. These
limitations also emerge in a new light when considered alongside the related debate within engineering concerning the relative advantages of direct experimentation and analytical mod75
eling.
The first limitation is epistemic. The embedded assumption
of all VaR techniques is that the uncertain future will resemble
76
the past. The point may be stated even more narrowly: the future will resemble a non-random sample of recent past condi77
tions. This point should not be over-emphasized; it is of course
true that the past is a useful guide for predicting the future.
But although VaR models almost always achieve their purpose
in normal market conditions, they do not work well when it
comes to the extreme, rare market movements that are most
78
closely associated with failure.
74. CROUHY ET AL., supra note 6, at 187. Lore attributes the invention of
the idea of VaR to risk managers within J.P. Morgan in the early 1990s. See
GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P.
MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE 33–34 (2009). The term appeared for the first time in a publicly available source in an influential report on derivatives published by the Group of
Thirty in 1993. See JORION, supra note 48, at 22.
75. See supra notes 28–37 and accompanying text.
76. See HULL, supra note 65, at 221 (“Additionally, we should bear in
mind that historical simulation assumes that the joint distribution of daily
changes in market variables is stationary through time. This is unlikely to be
exactly true and creates additional uncertainty about the value of VaR.”).
77. See Miller, supra note 55, at 64–65. In some respects, weighting recent
time series data improves the accuracy of VaR estimates due to the stickiness,
or cyclicality, of volatility levels. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 36.
78. CROUHY ET AL., supra note 6, at 162; PHILIPPE JORION, VALUE AT
RISK: THE NEW BENCHMARK FOR MANAGING FINANCIAL RISK 357 (3d ed.
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The second limitation is statistical. Even if we were convinced that the future would resemble the past, the look-back
periods are typically too small to permit the reliable statistical
79
inferences. Adopting a longer look-back period increases the
robustness of the data set but with fast-changing markets older
data might reflect obsolete market conditions and therefore
80
contribute little to the accuracy of the distribution.
Third, financial markets and institutions interact in complex ways. Even assuming that the values for relevant risk factors are normally distributed, in real financial markets a single
anomaly can ramify quickly through a financial network, interacting with other risk factors in unpredictable ways and poten81
tially increasing exposures dramatically. The models, by contrast, assume that financial markets resemble the weather and
place the risk manager in the role of meteorologist. Like the
molecules and energy that interact to produce weather phenomena, the millions of heterogeneous financial market participants ensure that their aggregate actions are susceptible to
randomized model. While this assumption no doubt holds during most periods, it breaks down in crises in large part because
stressed human actors are less predictable than stressed mole82
cules.
Instead, the risk factors interact in ways that defy the exante assumptions of the model. Risk is therefore said to be endogenous, which leads to unpredictable embedded properties
non susceptible to ex ante modeling. This might simply be another problem of statistical data insufficiency—risk managers
just don’t yet know how these interactions should be distribut83
ed as a statistical matter. However, some question whether
such complex phenomena as financial market crises are ever
84
capable of being the subject of predictive modeling.
If the problem is simply one of data insufficiency, there is a
partial solution: risk managers can build analytical models that
generate profit-loss data based on assumptions about how relevant parameters (e.g., interest rates, stock prices) interact to
2007).
79. Miller, supra note 55, at 65.
80. See JORION, supra note 48, at 222.
81. See Daníelsson, supra note 73, at 1276.
82. See id. at 1276–77.
83. See HUBBARD, supra note 32, at 185–87.
84. See Weber, supra note 10, at 691–97 (summarizing several experiments showing dramatic phase transitions in dynamically modeled financial
markets even with simple computer-based agents).
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85

produce historical returns. The predominant analytical modeling method is the Monte Carlo method familiar from the earlier
86
discussion of stress testing in engineering. When risk managers use Monte Carlo methods, they generate repeated simulations of risk factors, each time re-valuing the portfolio accord87
ing to the generated “scenario.” They can then run thousands
(or more) simulations to obtain a wider data set from which to
draw conclusions about VaR values. The virtue of Monte Carlo
is that it is not limited by the historical biases that hamper historical simulation. Instead of relying on the historical distribution of risk factors, risk managers have to design the stochastic
88
process by which the factor values are generated. This advantage also creates a model risk problem: risk managers need
to model the distribution of risk factors (and also the correlations between them) in a manner that is untethered to observed
89
historical facts. Fortunately, risk managers can work around
this problem by conducting multiple simulation runs with dif90
ferent sets of risk factor distribution models. One of the major
benefits of Monte Carlo simulation is that it offers the opportunity to engage in critical deliberation, including on failure
91
possibilities, as risk managers construct risk factor models.
C. A TAXONOMY OF FINANCIAL STRESS TESTING TECHNIQUES
The purpose of VaR, as noted above, is to communicate information concerning a firm’s vulnerability as it anticipates the
85. See HULL, supra note 65, at 233 (“The main alternative to the historical simulation approach for estimating VaR for market risk is what is known
as the model-building approach . . . .”); JORION, supra note 48, at 224–29. As
recently as 2000 banks made heavy use of analytical models in what are
known as the variance-covariance approach and the delta normal approach,
though today such approaches have fallen into disuse. Pérignon & Smith, supra note 66, at 367 n.15. For a technical summary of these techniques, both of
which require stylized statistical assumptions concerning the normal distribution of risk factor volatility, see DOWD, supra note 60, at 63–98; HULL, supra
note 65, at 233–52.
86. See Pérignon & Smith, supra note 66, at 372 fig. 4 (finding that 21% of
those large international banks that disclose their VaR methodologies, a group
that itself comprises 65% of all such banks, use Monte Carlo methods); supra
notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
87. CROUHY ET AL., supra note 6, at 212–16; cf. CHORAFAS, supra note 31,
at 147 (noting that Monte Carlo “uses random sampling to determine some
probabilistic property of a population of objects or events”).
88. JORION, supra note 48, at 224–26.
89. See id.
90. See CROUHY ET AL., supra note 6, at 216.
91. See CHORAFAS, supra note 31, at 155.
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conditions within which it will operate in an uncertain future.
The two dominant methods of VaR systems—historical simulation and Monte Carlo—accomplish that task by relying, respectively, on recent historical returns and assumptions concerning
93
the behavior of, and relationships between, risk factors. These
assumptions make VaR easy to use and communicate within
94
the firm. Accordingly, they enhance a firm’s understanding of
its vulnerabilities. But VaR still tells us very little about the
underlying causes of failure and the channels through which it
95
may emerge. Their limitations ensure that VaR is only a part
of a robust system of risk management.
Stress testing alerts management to adverse unexpected
outcomes related to a variety of contingent circumstances and
often provides an indication of the magnitude of the potential
96
loss or funding gap. The advantage of stress testing is its increased flexibility, when compared to VaR, to identify vulnera97
bilities to extreme events. Stress tests are therefore the most
direct connection between financial firm management and failure.
For historical and conceptual reasons, it is helpful to consider stress testing against the background of VaR techniques.
Risk managers developed stress testing methodologies along98
side VaR systems. And several of the exercises that carry the
“stress test” label are operationalized within VaR statistical
models. As one risk management expert noted, “stress-testing
means choosing scenarios that are costly and rare, and then
99
putting them to a valuation model.” While he overstates the
case somewhat—for instance, war games are increasingly seen
as a part of stress testing but are not susceptible to quantitative modeling—the links between stress testing and quantitative modeling techniques are historical and operational. This is
92. See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
93. See CROUHY ET AL., supra note 6, at 206–16.
94. See supra notes 62–63 and related text.
95. Cf. CHORAFAS, supra note 31, at 155 (“To depend on facts without putting them under stress is most dangerous because facts alone say nothing
about underlying causes.”).
96. See BCBS, STRESS TESTING PRINCIPLES, supra note 46, at 7.
97. CROUHY ET AL., supra note 6, at 239–40.
98. See Drehmann, supra note 4, at 62 (“Notwithstanding that objectives
are different for different stress tests current models share very much a common structure. . . . [T]his structure is rooted in the quantitative risk management framework.”).
99. Jeremy Berkowitz, A Coherent Framework for Stress Testing, 2 J. RISK
1, 2 (2000).
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not to say that the uses of stress tests are cabined within VaR
practices. When used properly, stress tests are “a complement,
100
rather than a supplement,” to these statistical measures.
The discussion below develops a typology of the contexts
within which stress testing has become an important component of risk management. Disparate methods of stress testing
can be distinguished. An overarching distinction may be observed between sensitivity analysis and scenario analysis. Scenario analysis can take the form of portfolio-driven scenario
analysis and event-driven scenario analysis. Event-driven scenario analysis may be further decomposed into historical sce101
nario analysis and hypothetical scenario analysis. War games
and regulator-conducted stress tests are addressed separately.
The below schematic depicts these basic distinctions, which are
further developed in this section:
Sensitivity
Analysis

Firmconducted
stress
tests

“War
Games”
Portfoliodriven

Scenario
Analysis
Financial
Stress Tests

Eventdriven

Historical,
eventdriven
Historical,
eventdriven

Regulatorconducted
stress
tests

Regular,
Periodic

Ad hoc,
“one off”

100. BIS, STRESS TESTING PAPER, supra note 59, at 3.
101. See BCBS, STRESS TESTING PRINCIPLES, supra note 46, at 5.
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1. Firm-Conducted Stress Tests
Firm-conducted stress tests can be divided into sensitivity
analyses, scenario analyses, and direct “war game” scenarios.
Brief descriptions of each category of exercise follow.
a. Sensitivity Analysis
When conducting sensitivity analysis, risk managers move
isolated risk factors by a unit amount to determine how “sensi102
tive” metrics such as profit and loss are to the changes. For
example, the firm might consider the impact of a 100 basis
point shift in bond yields, or a 10% decline in the stock market.
Sometimes these tests are performed on single, isolated variables, and other times risk managers consider correlations between the stressed variable and other risk factors to determine
how the firm would respond to a more comprehensive suite of
103
changes in risk factors.
When conducting sensitivity analysis within the VaR context, risk managers posit values for one or more risk factors
104
outside the scope of the VaR model. For example, risk managers using historical simulation VaR might re-value the firm’s
portfolio based on changes in interest rates that are outside the
confidence interval or even outside the historical distribution
entirely. The limitation of sensitivity analysis is that the stipulated changes in risk factor variables are unlikely to resemble a
105
future real-life scenario. Such tests nevertheless are very useful for verification purposes, allowing the firm “to form a first
approximation of the impact on the firm of a move in a finan106
cial variable.”
b. Portfolio-Driven Scenario Analysis
Scenario analysis takes the further step of considering how
specific real-world scenarios might cause those risk factor vari107
ables to shift.
When conducting portfolio-driven scenario
analysis, risk managers examine an existing portfolio, discuss
and individuate its vulnerabilities, and then imagine scenarios
108
under which those vulnerabilities would become stressed.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See BIS, STRESS TESTING PAPER, supra note 59, at 8.
See id.
Id. at 4.
SHIRREFF, supra note 6, at 66–67.
BIS, STRESS TESTING PAPER, supra note 59, at 8.
Id. at 6.
Id.
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The intellectual exercise is similar to the fault tree analysis
109
that reliability engineers perform. Some commentators refer
to these obviously imaginative, highly counter-factual portfolio110
driven tests as “reverse stress tests.” In effect, the risk managers attempt to reverse engineer a failure.
c. Event-Driven Scenario Analysis
By contrast, an event-driven stress test starts from an imagined scenario involving stressed risk factor variables in order
111
to see how the firm or the portfolio might respond. The scenario fixes the risk factor variables and subjects them to a risk
model—usually the firm’s VaR model—with respect to a given
set of exposures or portfolios, in the process generating a meas112
ure of the risk exposure to which that scenario corresponds.
It is therefore similar to sensitivity analysis, though it frequently considers multiple risk factor variables and is conceived of as a potentially real scenario, whether historical or
hypothetical. The schematic below illustrates this process.

Stress Test
Scenario
(or Sensitivity
Parameters)

Model
(i.e., DataGenerating
Process)

Portfolio(s)

Risk
Measure
as Output

When conducting historical scenario analysis, risk managers attempt to reproduce the effects of extreme historical
113
events. A hypothetical scenario is a significant market event
that has no direct historical precedent. Obviously, the latter involves significantly greater exercise of managerial discretion
114
and judgment in formulating the scenario. Risk managers
frequently invite senior managers, front desk sales staff, and
109. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
110. BCBS, STRESS TESTING PRINCIPLES, supra note 46, at 14.
111. BIS, STRESS TESTING PAPER, supra note 59, at 6.
112. See id. at 7.
113. See id. at 10 (highlighting the October 1987 stock market crash, the
1998 Russian debt default, the 2000 collapse of Long-Term Capital Management, the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and the 2001 U.S. terrorist attacks as
frequently used scenarios); SHIRREFF, supra note 6, at 66.
114. See Berkowitz, supra note 99, at 2–3 (“The problem is that choosing
stress-test scenarios is by its very nature subjective.”).
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115

economists to these discussions. At the enterprise level, this
broader participation also goes some way to ensuring that
cross-business correlations and interactions are taken into ac116
count. One commentator has disaggregated event-driven scenarios into four types of simulated shocks: (1) scenarios that
are expected “to occur more frequently than historical observations suggest”; (2) scenarios that have never occurred, but
which might occur; (3) scenarios reflecting “the possibility that
statistical patterns could break down in some circumstances”;
and (4) scenarios reflecting “structural breaks” that could occur
117
in the future. Hypothetical scenarios are particularly helpful
to test the robustness of assumptions underlying statistical
models for financial assets with limited historical data concern118
ing risk. If properly conducted, event-driven scenario analysis
can be used as a learning tool that “raises as many questions as
119
it answers.”
But for all their evident promise, event-driven stress tests
have not been implemented effectively. In a 2005 study, the
Bank for International Settlements found that some firms have
120
difficulty selecting “big picture” hypothetical scenarios.
A
2009 Government Accountability Office report on risk management failures singled out banks’ failure to create a scenario
for the hardly remote possibility of a severe downturn in the
121
economy.
d. War Games
War games lie on the outward bound of the stress testing
definitional category, in large part because they do not fit neatly with analytical modeling tools such as VaR. I use the term
here to connote direct simulations of scenarios where firm personnel “act out” how they would react to the appearance of
115. BIS, STRESS TESTING PAPER, supra note 59, at 7.
116. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-499T, FINANCIAL REGULATION: REVIEW OF REGULATORS’ OVERSIGHT OF RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AT A LIMITED NUMBER OF LARGE, COMPLEX FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS:
TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON SECS., INS., & INVS. OF THE S. COMM.
ON BANKING, HOUS., & URBAN AFFAIRS, 111TH CONG. 22–24 (2009) [hereinafter GAO Risk Management Oversight Assessment], available at http://www.gao
.gov/products/GAO-09-499T.
117. Drehmann, supra note 4, at 73–74.
118. BCBS, STRESS TESTING PRINCIPLES, supra note 46, at 9.
119. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 5.
120. BIS, STRESS TESTING PAPER, supra note 59, at 8.
121. GAO Risk Management Oversight Assessment, supra note 116, at 22.
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stressed market variables. Despite their ill fit with quantitative
models, war games contribute to managerial understanding of
122
uncertainty and how failure might develop. The authors of a
book on political risk laud war games scenarios as being motivated “to inspire creative problem solving and to spur manag123
ers to think about unthinkable outcomes.” The same could be
said with respect to financial risk.
Unsurprisingly, the roots of war games can be traced in
124
military history. Military planners run “hard gaming” simulations conducted with computer models alone, “soft gaming”
simulations involving indoor simulations, and “field training
exercises” involving a large number of personnel across even
125
thousands of square miles. As early as the 1970s, corporate
firms began to conduct their own direct simulations of adverse
events. Royal Dutch-Shell was an early pioneer of these techniques, even taking its executives through the possibility of a
sharp rise in oil prices a year before the 1973 Arab oil embar126
go. Even today, Royal Dutch-Shell is applauded for its political war gaming scenario analysis in connection with invest127
ment projects.
The Deloitte consultancy developed a War
Game-style simulation that it labeled a “stress test” to gauge
the adequacy of measures developed by businesses and those
responsible for IT and transportation infrastructure decisions
128
in advance of the 2012 summer Olympic Games in London. In
finance, some commentators have called for regular use of war

122. See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, STANDARDS FOR RAPID RESOLUPLANS 10 (2011), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/
wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Economic_Mobility/Standards_Rapid_Resolution_
Plans.pdf.
123. IAN BREMMER & PRESTON KEAT, THE FAT TAIL: THE POWER OF POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE FOR STRATEGIC INVESTING 26 (2009).
124. B. Sheppard & D. Slavin, The Use of War Game Simulations for Business Strategies, in REAL-TIME AND DELIBERATIVE DECISION MAKING 77, 77
(Igor Linkov et al. eds., 2008).
125. Id. at 79–80; see also SHIRREFF, supra note 6, at 108 (“The British
armed forces play war games once a year. Two sides code-named ‘Red’ and
‘Blue’ slug it out in virtual warfare. For them the purpose is to test equipment,
communications and soldiers without the expense and losses associated with a
real war.”).
126. BREMMER & KEAT, supra note 123, at 26–27; SHIRREFF, supra note 6,
at 106–07.
127. See BREMMER & KEAT, supra note 123, at 26–27.
128. Keith Weir, “Stress Test” Highlights Olympic Transport Fears,
REUTERS (June 18, 2012), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/06/17/uk-olympics
-business-stress-idUKBRE85G0SB20120617.
TION
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gaming in developing resolution plans—also known as “living
129
wills” or “funeral plans.”
The unique advantage of war game simulations is their
ability to “simulat[e] human imponderables and behaviors” as
130
they might unfold as failure approaches. To harness these
unique advantages of war games, testers apply aspects of direct
experimental stress testing techniques from mechanical and
131
structural engineering to the human organizational realm.
But in order for the war games to produce useful failure-related
information, the human decision makers involved in the war
132
game must remain open to the possibility of failure. Otherwise, the war game becomes less a learning exercise and more
of a validation of prior commitments and strategies. In his account of the Midway Battle with U.S. Naval forces over the Pacific, Japanese General Mitsuo Fuchida—who led Japan in the
successful Pearl Harbor raid—recounts how Rear Admiral
Matome Ugaki overruled decisions by the umpires of Japanese
133
central command war games. Consequently, the results of the
game suggested that the Japanese naval conquest of the Pacific
134
would proceed much more smoothly than expected. Military
assets were allocated in part based on the outcomes of the war
games with disastrous consequences for the Japanese forces,
135
which had underestimated the riskiness of its strategy.
The conceptual transition from stress testing of physical
systems such as suspension bridges to social systems such as
financial markets is marked by the presence of strategic human
actors. Because people think and plan strategically, and then
make decisions based on their plans, they are much more diffi136
cult to model than physical system components. A social system’s stability depends not only on the risks to which it is sub129. See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 122, at 1 n.1.
130. Sheppard & Slavin, supra note 124, at 80.
131. For a discussion of direct experimental stress testing techniques in the
engineering discipline, see supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
132. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 122, at 6 (“Systemically
significant activities should be identified and provisions made to maintain
them through a failure.”).
133. MITSUO FUCHIDA & MASATAKE OKUMITA, MIDWAY: THE BATTLE THAT
DOOMED JAPAN, THE JAPANESE NAVY’S STORY 124–26 (Clarke H. Kawakami
& Roger Pineau eds., 1955).
134. Id. at 96.
135. Id. at 96–98.
136. See W. Brian Arthur, Complexity and the Economy, 284 SCIENCE 107,
107 (1999); J. Doyne Farmer et al., Is Economics the Next Physical Science?, 58
PHYSICS TODAY 37, 39 (2005).
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ject at any given point, but also on our perceptions of those
137
risks. While it is true that “the odds [of] a 100-year storm do
not change because people think that such a storm has become
138
more likely,” the odds of a liquidity run are very much affected by subjective human perceptions of its likelihood. This pre139
sents the endogeneity of risk problem discussed earlier. War
gaming allows risk managers to become more familiar with
these odds, or at least with the causal network out of which
such an event may spring. Once a sufficient number of games
have been conducted, it may be possible to use the data in statistical models to apply to other contexts.
2. Regulator-Conducted Stress Tests
Regulator-conducted stress tests are performed by the financial regulator, not the regulated financial firms. This category of stress tests includes isolated, one-off stress tests as well
140
as more regular, structured programs of stress testing. The
subjects of regular, structured programs of stress tests can be
141
individual institutions or entire financial systems. The Financial Stability Assessment Program (FSAP), established by
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in response to the
Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, is the most prominent
example of a regular stress testing program of entire financial
systems. Under the FSAP, IMF personnel conduct an in-depth
142
analysis of an individual country’s financial system. Each
FSAP concludes with the preparation of a Financial System
Stability Assessment (FSSA), which focuses on issues relevant
143
to IMF surveillance.
One of the main components of the
137. JOHN KAMBHU ET AL., NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR
UNDERSTANDING SYSTEMIC RISK 65 (2007).
138. Id. at 48.
139. See supra Part II.B.
140. See Marco Sorge, Stress-Testing Financial Systems: An Overview of
Current Methodologies 1 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 165,
2004), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/work165.pdf (labeling these tests
the “piecewise approach” and “integrated approach,” respectively).
141. Id. at 6.
142. FSAP assessments take place on a voluntary basis. As of 2009, over
three-fourths of IMF member countries have undertaken an FSAP assessment. Public Information Notice No. 04/33, Int’l Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Reviews Experience with the Financial Sector Assessment Program,
Options for the Future, and Complementary Reforms in Surveillance and the
Assessment of Standards and Codes (Sept. 29, 2009), available at http://
www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2009/pn09123.htm.
143. Id.
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FSSA is a system-wide stress test to assess financial stabil144
ity. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) economist
Paul Kupiec describes the FSAP stress tests as follows:
Stress tests often are designed with the cooperation of the national
authorities with a goal to quantify the systemwide exposures that
may result from a significant change in financial market fundamentals. The scenarios are usually specified as partial equilibrium “what
if” type exercises where estimates of the balance sheet consequences
of a financial event are quantified using data from a number of insti145
tutions or with aggregate data.

Kupiec judges the stress tests to be of little informational value
due to regulators’ lack of access to information on banks’ off146
balance sheet and derivative positions. He also laments the
partial equilibrium assumptions of the stress tests—that is,
their focus on a single factor in isolation without considering
how stress in that factor might interact dynamically with other
147
risk factors.
In recent years, policymakers have focused increasingly on
regulator-conducted stress tests. U.S. bank regulators conducted a one-off, ad hoc round of stress tests for the nineteen largest bank holding companies in 2009 as a linchpin of their ef148
forts to stabilize the reeling banking industry. Since then,
European banking authorities have conducted several rounds
149
of ad hoc stress tests of banks subject to their supervision.
Furthermore, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 made regular, periodic stress test150
ing of banks a new responsibility for bank regulators. These
matters are taken up in greater detail below in Part IV.C.
The below table lays depicts the rough taxonomy of stress
tests presently in use at financial institutions. It highlights the
extent of managerial involvement in the design and conduct of
tests. It also registers the extent to which the tests rely on VaR,
which, as discussed above, yields precise, quantifiable numerical outputs. Notice that managerial involvement in stress testing is highest where VaR usage does not predominate. The
144. See Paul Kupiec, The IMF-World Bank Financial Sector Assessment
Program: A View from the Inside, in SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES: RESOLVING
LARGE BANK INSOLVENCIES 69, 71 (Douglas D. Evanoff & George G. Kaufman
eds., 2005).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 77.
147. Id.
148. See infra note 260 and accompanying text.
149. See infra notes 284–87 and accompanying text.
150. See infra note 265 and accompanying text.
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trade-off between open-ended managerial involvement and the
precision of largely automated analytical tools has significant
implications for design of a regulatory system of stress testing.
This point is taken up in the next Part.
Types of Stress Tests

Conducted
by
Regulator
Conducted
by Firm

Management
Involvement

Usage
of VaR

None

Some

None

Some

Regular,
Periodic

System-wide

Ad hoc,
“One-off”

System-wide

Sensitivity

Single Isolated
Variable

Low

Predomi
nant

Multiple Variable

Low

Predomi
nant

Portfolio-Driven/
“Reverse Stress
Tests”

High

No

EventDriven

Historical

Low

Some

Hypothetical

High

Some

High

No

Scenario

Institution-specific
Institution-specific

“War Games”

III. ELABORATING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
DELIBERATION-ORIENTED STRESS TESTING AND
ASSURANCE-ORIENTED STRESS TESTING
Note that in all their manifestations highlighted above,
stress tests share a common element: they provide information
to decision makers concerning economic outcomes in an uncertain future. The category of “decision makers” includes, most
prominently, risk managers, but also could include business
managers, directors, regulators, investors, and even financial
service consumers. This suggests a general point on risk management that has been underemphasized in both the technical
and academic finance and law literature: namely, that VaR is
only one of several modes by which information production occurs in financial firms. The role of risk managers is to adopt
and administer analytical tools that generate information and
then communicate it throughout the firm, at times competing
for executive and board attention or triggering automated pro-
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cesses—e.g., to sell off or hedge risk exposures. True to their
roots in the engineering discipline, stress tests in finance are
usually the predominant context in which ex ante information
concerning failure and stress that is not captured in the VaR
framework is produced. Therefore, the mix of tools that a particular firm or regulator adopts determines the decisional infrastructure within which a firm’s managers and directors process and act on failure- and stress-related information. Each
system of stress testing implies a determination as to how
much institutional resources, imagination, and attention
should be devoted to imagining “dark visions” as plausible scenarios that ultimately might color firm or regulator decision152
making.
Of course, some uses of stress tests contribute more meaningfully than others to an understanding of the likely channels
through which failure might emerge. The diversity of contexts
in which stress tests can be put to use highlights the need for
policymakers and scholars to make appropriate distinctions
153
among types of stress tests. This Article argues in favor of an
overarching distinction between two broad stress testing approaches: assurance-oriented stress testing and deliberationoriented stress testing. These terms describe the firm’s institutional orientation to stress testing—i.e., its attitudinal settings
and decisional infrastructure—but they are also helpful to
characterize regulatory interventions according to the sort of
institutional orientation regulators are seeking to promote.
That is, a regulated bank may implement a stress testing program that draws heavily from an assurance-oriented stress
testing approach, but the bank’s regulators may intervene by
promoting deliberation-oriented stress testing during bank examinations or through rulemaking. Thus, assurance-oriented
stress testing and deliberation-oriented stress testing refer to
the dispositions of the actors conducting and deliberating on

151. Cf. CROUHY, supra note 6, at xvii.
152. See Saul Hansell & Joseph B. Treaster, The Job of Imagining the Unimaginable, and Bracing for It, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2001, at C1 (explaining
how the September 11 attacks affected Wall Street risk management strategies).
153. See Drehmann, supra note 4, at 62 (“It is not enough to call for more
stress testing but it is also important to know what should ultimately be
achieved with the stress test results.”).
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the tests and the use to which they are put; the distinction does
154
not categorize the particular types of tests themselves.
Stress testing as a regulatory tool is in its infancy, so the
binary is admittedly rough, but certain generalizations can be
observed from these two orientations. Each represents an encounter with the concept of failure, but from different perspectives. Assurance-oriented stress testing privileges static scenarios, draws from audit culture, relies on historical precedents,
examines tested variables in isolation, requires precise estimation, and is motivated by compliance and verification con155
cerns. By contrast, deliberation-oriented stress testing privileges dynamic scenarios, draws from business operations
culture, relies on imagination, considers the interactivity of
tested variables, remains open to open-ended and uncertain
156
outcomes, and is motivated by governance concerns.
A. ASSURANCE-ORIENTED STRESS TESTING
As with other audit-like exercises, assurance-oriented
stress testing frequently involves communicative events for
which the relevant audience carries expectations as to the for157
mat and precision of the communicated information. Thus a
program of regulator-conducted stress tests of banks with announced results to assuage market concerns about the banks’
bad loans or securities would be an example of assuranceoriented stress testing. The test would be designed to communicate information to bank investors and counterparties,
and even the broader economy, concerning the banks’ susceptibility to failure. So too would a bank’s internal sensitivity anal158
ysis program designed to verify that the assumed distribution
of risk factor variables in its VaR model did not miss sharp
non-linear increases in expected losses immediately outside the
distribution. Here, the audience is the risk management team
itself and the exercise can be conceived of as a spot audit check
of the VaR model’s robustness. These expectations require a
degree of precision in terms of the stress tests’ final outputs.
Greater precision facilitates communication to the audience,
but it requires greater rigidity in the design of the stress test so
154. See supra Part II.C for a discussion of the various types of financial
stress tests.
155. Weber, supra note 59, at 2 n.3.
156. Id.
157. On the importance of audience, see Drehmann, supra note 4, passim.
158. See supra notes 102–06 and accompanying text.
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as to produce quantifiable metrics. This orientation towards
stress testing, while undoubtedly of great importance, receives
the most attention from industry and commentators, but the
familiarity of these uses of stress tests disguises their technical
and institutional limitations.
Because it requires greater precision, assurance-oriented
stress testing does not readily accommodate qualitative business judgments or take into account the dynamism of financial
159
markets. Michel Crouhy makes this point with respect to the
dynamic supply and demand of liquidity at financial institutions:
Market crises unfold over a period of time, during which [market]
liquidity may dry out. Yet most scenario analyses are static in nature,
i.e., are one-period models and do not allow for the trading of positions in an environment where liquidity varies from one period to the
next . . . . [Such analyses] assume that events occur simultaneously,
and that the portfolio [being tested] remains constant during the period. The modeling framework usually does not allow for dynamic
hedging or the unwinding of positions.
....
....
. . . [T]raditional VaR models are, by construction, static. Increasing
the risk horizon from one day to ten days, one month, or one year,
does not make the model more dynamic. . . .
....
Clearly, liquidity risk cannot be factored into this traditional static
160
framework.

Crouhy is making a point about the endogeneity, or reflexive,
161
nature of risk in financial markets. Assurance-oriented stress
testing typically models an exogenous, or outside, shock to the
test subject. The second-order (and third-order, and so forth)
effects on the firm—to say nothing of those of counterparties
and others transacting in the relevant market—are not modeled. This omission fails to take account of the financial system
as it actually exists as a network of counterparties that interact
162
and respond to one another.
It echoes Kupiec’s concerns

159. See BCBS, STRESS TESTING PRINCIPLES, supra note 46, at 2–3.
160. CROUHY ET AL., supra note 6, at 241.
161. See Drehmann, supra note 4, at 77–79; see also supra Part II.B.2’s discussion of the technical limitations of statistical models.
162. See Prassana Gai & Sujit Kapadia, Contagion in Financial Networks,
466 PROCS. ROYAL SOC’Y A 2401 passim (2010); Erlend Nier et al., Network
Models and Financial Stability, 31 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 2033 passim (2007).
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about the partial equilibrium assumptions embedded in the
163
IMF’s FSAP stress tests.
The intellectual context of a stress test used as an assurance-verification tool takes the business decisions to allocate
capital to a particular portfolio or business line as its starting
point. The exercise of imagination by risk managers is not encouraged. The question posed—i.e., “What would be the loss if
things got this bad?”—admits a single answer. Of course, this is
also its virtue. Assurance-oriented stress testing only becomes
a problem when it becomes the predominant feature of a firm’s
stress testing program rather than an ancillary feature of a
broader, more deliberative program. Even a superficial comparison between (1) a spot-check sensitivity analysis addressing a
change in prevailing interest rates and (2) a “reverse stress
164
test” exercise inquiring into how a portfolio might fail due to
interest rate fluctuations illustrates the point. The former will
yield a useable data point or a “pass-fail” or “yes-no” determination, whereas the latter would yield instead a set of further
165
questions. And it is easy to see how the precision of the result
can lead to such stress tests being implemented to facilitate
166
simple, binary audit-like tasks.
I do not mean to overstate these critiques of assuranceoriented stress testing. It contributes to risk managers’ understanding of portfolio risk and its ease of use ensures frequent
recourse to it. It is certainly more open-ended and flexible than
closed VaR model systems. However, assurance-oriented stress
testing on its own will not promote more ambitious regulatory
objectives of financial stability and institution-level safety and
167
soundness. As such, attempts by policymakers, regulated financial institutions, or trade associations to cast assuranceoriented stress testing initiatives as something more than helpful verification tools should be evaluated skeptically. Such
claims might reveal more about our anxiety concerning failure
and stress more than the ability of assurance-oriented stress
163. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
164. On reverse stress tests, see supra Part II.C.1.b.
165. See Nassim N. Taleb et al., A New Heuristic Measure of Fragility and
Tail Risks: Application to Stress Testing 9–11 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working
Paper No. WP/12/216, 2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
ft/wp/2012/wp12216.pdf (“[S]tress test results are often presented as having a
binary ‘pass/fail’ outcome.”).
166. See Wessel, supra note 2, at A2 (discussing implications flowing from
the fact that “the word ‘test’ . . . implies pass or fail”).
167. See supra Part III.A.
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testing to contribute meaningfully to our ability to understand
them. Michael Power has argued that a similar phenomenon
exists with respect to risk management more generally: that
the modern emphasis on risk management reflects our aspira168
tions to control increasingly uncontrollable phenomena.
B. DELIBERATION-ORIENTED STRESS TESTING
These limitations of assurance-oriented stress testing
emerge even more clearly when it is compared with deliberation-oriented stress testing. In contrast to assurance-oriented
stress testing, deliberation-oriented stress testing privileges
dynamic scenarios, draws from business operations culture, relies on imagination, considers the interactivity of tested variables, remains open to uncertainty, and is motivated by governance concerns. In this manifestation, stress testing emerges
less as a mechanical tool for regulators and risk managers and
more as an aspirational internal corporate governance norm
that is preoccupied with stress, failure, and instability. Deliberation-oriented stress testing aspires to inform risk managers
and other executives, as well as the board, of risks across the
entire enterprise in addition to portfolio-specific risks. Furthermore, unlike assurance-oriented stress testing, it has no
built-in audience; it is engaged in open-ended deliberation for

168. See MICHAEL POWER, ORGANIZED UNCERTAINTY: DESIGNING A WORLD
RISK MANAGEMENT 5 (2007) (“[T]he phenomenon of ‘risk’ management of
more and more aspects of social and organizational life reflects an increase in
social expectations about the decidability and management of dangers and opportunities.”); see also LEE CLARKE, MISSION IMPROBABLE: USING FANTASY
DOCUMENTS TO TAME DISASTER 4 (1999) (“[U]nder conditions of high uncertainty the promise and apparatus of rational planning itself becomes mainly
rhetorical, becomes a means by which plans—independently of their functional
relevance to the task—can be justified as reasonable promises that exigencies
can be controlled. When uncertainty about key aspects of a task is high, rationalistic plans . . . become rationality badges, labels proclaiming that organizations and experts can control things that are, most likely, outside the range
of their expertise. . . . Thus do organizations try to control the uncontrollable.”); Daníelsson, supra note 73, at 1274 (“There is . . . an increasing body of
evidence that inherent limitations in risk modelling technology, coupled with
imperfect regulatory design, acts more like a placebo rather than a
scientiﬁcally proven preventer of crashes it is sometimes made out to be.”);
Weber, supra note 43, at 1009 (presenting theory that risk management might
be “a placeholder delimiting the range of objects that demand organizational
control rather than the range of objects that are in fact susceptible to such control”).
OF
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the sake of better understanding and communicating failure
169
vulnerabilities.
Andrew Haldane, Executive Director for Financial Stability at the Bank of England, has advanced what he calls a “fivepoint plan” to guide the supervision of stress testing practices
170
at banks.
His proposals touch on several deliberationoriented stress testing themes. First, he recommends both active involvement of regulators in crafting stress scenarios and
the use of “reverse stress tests” by firm risk managers—what
he refers to as “test[ing] . . . the destruction of their balance
171
sheets.” Second, as a starting point, regulators should arrange for banks to conduct common stress scenarios to facilitate
172
benchmarking of the results and the banks’ VaR models.
Third, stress tests should be dynamic, so that the second and
subsequent round interactions, and their consequences for sys173
tem-wide risk, can be evaluated. He describes such an approach as “iterative” stress testing and highlights the usefulness of such an approach to uncover phenomena relating to
asset sales and liquidity hoarding that cannot be taken into ac174
count by assurance-oriented stress testing exercises. Haldane
175
describes such an exercise as a “stress test cum war game.”
Fourth, regulators must engage in a follow-up dialogue with
176
bank management concerning the results of the stress tests.
Haldane’s fifth point is addressed to what regulators should do
with the information gleaned from stress tests rather than how
177
the tests should be conducted. Taleb et al. similarly pick up
on deliberation themes when they propose exploring the fragili-

169. See Drehmann, supra note 4, at 61 (observing that when used for purposes of communicating risk throughout a firm, stress tests should be “transparent and suitable for storytelling”).
170. Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Bank of Eng., Why Banks Failed the
Stress Test, Remarks at the Marcus-Evans Conference on Stress-Testing 8–9
(Feb. 9–10, 2009) [hereinafter Why Banks Failed the Stress Test], available at
http://www.bis.org/review/r090219d.pdf.
171. Id. at 8.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 8–9.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 9.
176. Id.
177. Specifically, he argues that regulators should (1) take the results of
the tests and information gleaned during post-test discussion into account
when setting firms’ capital and liquidity buffers and (2) require public disclosure of results to enhance market discipline. Id. at 9.
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ty of stress tests themselves—by asking “[h]ow would our esti178
mates respond to a marginal change of the stress scenario?”
Even some industry representatives have come to advocate
for a greater emphasis of deliberation-oriented stress testing, in
179
spite of its greater costs. The Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group III (CRMPG), the membership of which is
comprised almost entirely of representatives of the largest in180
ternationally active banks, published a series of recommen181
dations on how to limit systemic risk in 2008. The CRMPG
recommended several practices that resonate with deliberationoriented stress testing, including: (1) disclosure to counterparties of stress test results on term sheets for difficult-tounderstand financial instruments, which should facilitate
182
learning; (2) reverse stress tests to address issues not cap183
tured by VaR models; (3) incorporation of an “expanded suite
of stress tests into a formalized production schedule, against
which trends and developments in key risk factors and expo184
sure amounts can be tracked“; and (4) liquidity stress tests to
gauge how unsecured and secured funding sources could dry up
185
during times of stress. The report also makes specific recommendations concerning the scenarios firms should run. Of particular note is consideration of: reputational and franchiserelated risks, off-balance sheet exposures, and, as noted above,
liquidity implications of stress (even on an intraday basis) at
186
the consolidated- and entity-level.
This is a far cry from
standard VaR-dominated risk management.
The great promise of deliberation-oriented stress testing is
that it will foster a more mindful decisional infrastructure
within financial institutions that institutionalizes the continuous deliberation on failure, catastrophe, and stress. By thus intervening into the corporate governance infrastructure of fi178. Taleb et al., supra note 165, at 6.
179. On the relative costliness of deliberation-oriented stress testing, see
infra notes 447–56 and accompanying text.
180. See COUNTERPARTY RISK MGMT. POLICY GRP. III, CONTAINING SYSTEMIC RISK: THE ROAD TO REFORM, at vii–x (2008) [hereinafter COUNTERPARTY RM GROUP REPORT], available at http://www.crmpolicygroup.org/docs/
CRMPG-III.pdf.
181. Id. at 18–19.
182. Id. at A-1 to A-2.
183. Id. at 84–85.
184. Id. at 85.
185. Id. at 27–28.
186. Id. at 28–30.
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nancial institutions, stress testing mandates might curb managers’ and boards’ historic tendency to adopt excessively accommodating attitudes towards risk. In the process, it might
facilitate regulatory efforts to promote the increasingly indeterminate and shifting statutory objective of financial stability
—in other words, resilience to failure—under conditions of un187
certainty, volatility, and authentic complexity.
C. FOUR HYPOTHETICAL CASE STUDIES OF STRESS TESTING
The four hypothetical case studies developed below illustrate both the wide breadth of techniques that go by the stress
testing label and the contrast between assurance-oriented
stress testing and deliberation-oriented stress testing. In the
first and second case studies, two banks design and conduct
stress tests to assess the likely impact of adverse developments
in the leveraged loan business. The third and fourth case studies introduce the effects of regulatory influence on stress testing, each describing an initiative by state insurance regulators
to use stress testing concepts in their supervision of life insurance companies.
1. “Bank of Hazard”
Consider two fictional firms—we’ll call them Bank of Hazard (Hazard) and Bank of Prudence (Prudence)—each of which
conducts a hypothetical event-driven stress test of its leveraged
loan portfolio. Hazard submits its portfolio to a hypothetical
188
scenario involving a rapid 250-basis point (bp)
jump in
189
spreads on a leveraged loan index, a scenario well outside the
scope of the Hazard’s VaR model. The risk managers selected
187. See generally Weber, supra note 10 (arguing that in many respects
contemporary financial systems are characterized by complexity rather than
mere complicatedness and discussing the implications).
188. One bp is one-hundredth of a percent. JOHN DOWNES & JORDON
ELLIOT GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 56 (7th
ed. 2006). Thus, a 400-bp increase in spreads is a 4.00% increase. A dramatic
increase in leveraged loan spreads would signal the market’s heightened perception of the riskiness of the loans and, ceteris paribus, would necessarily entail a corresponding price reduction in the market value of the loans.
189. The “spread” of a fixed income asset is the incremental amount of the
asset’s yield that is greater than a benchmark rate, such as LIBOR (the London Interbank Offered Rate). For example, if LIBOR is 2.5% and a leveraged
loan yield is 7.0%, then its spread is 4.5%. A 250 bp increase in the spread
would result in 7.75% yield. In this context, the “yield” expresses the ratio of
contractual interest payments over the current market price of the loan. See
id. at 803.
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250 bp because it represented the “nightmare scenario” of the
highest single-day jump in the index spread since its inception
fifteen years ago. Hazard risk managers conduct the test by revaluing each of the leveraged loans in the portfolio in light of
the hypothetical spread increase and compute the aggregate
value of the portfolio ($450 million), which is $100 million lower
than its current market value ($550 million). Next, they compare the $100 million difference to the VaR figure based on a
95% confidence level, which is $70 million—i.e., the VaR model
suggests that Hazard should be 95% certain that it will not lose
more than $70 million over the applicable time horizon. The
$100 million loss is 133% of the VaR figure of $75 million.
Because Hazard has a firm-wide risk limit policy that prohibits it from incurring any exposure for which a stress test reveals a potential loss of 150% of the VaR figure, the risk managers do not take any corrective action, but they send a memo
to the leveraged loan department and the corporate treasury
department notifying them that an abrupt 250-bp increase in
spreads would very nearly bump up to the risk exposure limits
set by top management. Some of the bankers take note, perhaps even pausing to consider which categories of leverage
loans might be most susceptible to such a spread increase and
whether similar profits—whether from interest on the loans or
transaction fees—could be obtained without incurring that risk.
Others silently whisper to themselves “There’s no way spreads
are going to jump that high anytime soon; besides, my comp is
based on deal volume and management told us to do more
deals.”
2. “Bank of Prudence”
Risk managers at Bank of Prudence conduct a similar scenario test involving a 400 bp increase in the index spread.
While the basic idea for the scenario originated during exchanges between bankers and risk managers within the leveraged loan department, the risk managers discussed the scenario with risk managers from the corporate treasury department.
The corporate treasury risk managers point out that in such a
scenario two other problems might occur: providers of Prudence’s short-term credit, such as repo lenders, will become
concerned about (1) Prudence’s creditworthiness and (2) the
value of the leveraged loans that Prudence has pledged as collateral for any secured short-term lending.
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As such, they suggest the scenario should also test for the
effects on Prudence’s liquidity position of a simultaneous 25%
increase in collateral demands from short-term funding
sources. Another risk manager points out that such a dramatic
increase in spreads and collateral demands might very well be
accompanied by a failure of one of Prudence’s larger counterparties that has been known to trade in the riskiest leveraged
loans and rely heavily on overnight repo lending to fund its operations. The risk managers decide to run the base scenario
with the 400 bp spread increase and the 25% increase in collateral demands and an alternative scenario that assumes that a
large counterparty defaults on all its unsecured obligations to
Prudence.
3. Isolated Stress Test of GMDB Exposures
Consider next two hypothetical regulatory examples of
stress testing. In the first example, a state insurance regulator
conducts an isolated, one-off sensitivity analysis of the guaranteed minimum death benefit (GMDB) variable annuity contracts for all the life insurance companies subject to its jurisdic190
tion. All of the tested companies had regulatory capital levels
in excess of the “company action level” that would require regu191
latory intervention. Nevertheless, recent press coverage of
the unfavorable experience of GMDB business in several companies domiciled in other jurisdictions has led to concerns
about annuitants liquidating their GMDB contracts. The attenuated investor confidence concerns the state insurance regulator because large policy liquidations deplete an insurance
company of assets to a point at which its claims-paying ability
is impaired. This concern motivates the regulator to conduct
the stress test, which assumes a stock market decline of 20%

190. GMDB contracts are a type of variable annuity contract. Whereas
with a normal variable annuity the annuitant’s contributions are invested in
assets for which the annuitant and his or her beneficiaries bear the entire
amount of market risk, with a GMDB contract, the insurance company guarantees a minimum payout in the event of the annuitant’s death irrespective of
the balance of the variable annuity account, thereby shifting a portion of the
market risk from the annuitant’s beneficiaries to the insurance company.
191. See Robert F. Weber, Combating the Teleological Drift of Life Insurance Solvency Regulation: The Case for a Meta-Risk Management Approach to
Principles-Based Reserving, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 35, 61 n.103 (2011) (describing the risk-based capital regime and the role of “company action level”
capital triggers).

2014]

STRESS TESTING

2279

192

over the course of three months. The regulator announces
that it will require the holding company of any insurance company that “fails” the stress test to contribute additional capital
193
to the company. The regulator explains that a company will
fail the stress test if its regulatory capital would be less than
200% of the “company action level” under the scenario. Of the
ten insurance companies subjected to the stress test, nine pass
and one fails. The failing company’s holding company is instructed to contribute an additional $40 million of additional
capital. The regulator issues a press release announcing the results of the stress test, which is reported in the industry press
and sent via email to every registered insurance agent in the
state.
4. Ongoing Program of Dialogic Stress Testing of GMDB
Exposures
In the second example, the insurance regulator of another
state with several large life insurance companies, similarly
concerned by the volume of GMDB business underwritten by
its domiciliary companies, establishes a stress testing program.
The regulator publishes a circular instructing all insurance
companies subject to its supervision to stress test their GMDB
contract portfolios regularly for “equity market and related
risks.” The circular provides for direct involvement of regulatory examiners in testing design and implementation, and regulatory review of results.
Several companies quickly contact their examiners and
lament the lack of precision in the circular, asking what specific
steps should be taken. The other companies begin planning for
the stress test. Some companies’ risk managers actively solicit
input from affiliated investment banks and investment advisors concerning the equity markets. Two companies discuss
with the product design colleagues what the impact of a dramatic equity decline would be on the behavior of existing annuitants, focusing in particular on whether they would increasingly liquidate their policies. Four companies involve senior
management in several of the stress test planning meetings.
192. A decline in the stock market would result in a decrease in the
amounts of the variable annuity accounts. If the account values were to fall
below the guaranteed amounts under the GMDB contracts, the insurance
company would be obligated to make up the difference. See supra note 190 and
accompanying text.
193. Weber, supra note 191, at 61.
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Others simply submit the stress test plan to senior management for final approval, and one firm fails to consult senior
management at all.
The companies discuss their initial stress test designs with
examiners, and explain how their proprietary quantitative statistical models would implement the stress tests. The examiners meet subsequently to de-brief each other on the initial
meetings and identify attributes of the stress test, such as consideration of the dynamic interaction of equity market declines
and withdrawal of annuitants’ funds. They then meet again
with the insurance companies and present several of the identified attributes as mandatory best practices for this and future
stress tests. Pursuant to the circular, the insurance companies
are ordered to review the results of the stress test with senior
management and the board of directors. For those insurance
companies identified by examiners as having designed unsophisticated stress tests or having failed to consult affiliated expertise or management input, examiners direct their risk management departments to change their stress testing practices in
certain respects and notify them that the companies would be
subject to spot examinations of stress testing practices with
greater frequency.
IV. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE REGULATION OF
FINANCIAL STRESS TESTING
Having presented a normative case in favor of a regulatory
regime that fosters deliberation-oriented stress testing, the Article now turns to a brief history of regulatory interventions into stress testing. Have legislators and regulators been aware of
the difference between deliberation-oriented stress testing and
assurance-oriented stress testing? And to the extent that they
have, have their policy initiatives been effective in promoting
deliberation-oriented stress testing among regulated financial
firms? The following chronology demonstrates that to date, assurance-oriented stress testing has predominated over deliberation-oriented stress testing in guiding regulatory activity.
A. TWO IMPROBABLE EARLY STRESS TESTING INITIATIVES
Regulatory interventions into stress testing practices had
improbable origins. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB), which was pilloried for poor performance and eventually disbanded in the aftermath of the savings-and-loan debacle, issued a series of innovative bulletins and policy state-
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ments to supervised thrifts concerning their management of in194
terest rate risk and derivatives-related risks in the 1980s.
Dramatic spikes in interest rates in the early 1980s led to deposit flight from the thrifts, which were statutorily proscribed
195
from offering competitive interest rates on deposits. Congress
eventually liberalized thrift deposit rates and the FLHBB removed the asset restrictions that formerly had prevented
196
thrifts from underwriting non-traditional loan products. But
the FHLBB quickly became concerned that thrifts were assuming risks that compromised their safety and soundness as a result of their new investment powers, including by speculating
197
in derivatives. This series of late-1980s FHLBB pronouncements represents the first intervention by bank supervisory authorities into risk management and stress testing regulation.
Thrift Bulletin 12, published in 1988, is especially relevant in
198
this context. In it, the agency required not only that thrift
boards oversee management’s development of a “comprehensive
business plan” detailing risk management objectives (including
position limits), but also that thrifts perform “sensitivity analy199
sis” before investing in certain instruments.
Four years later, another improbable innovator—the U.S.
Congress—utilized the concept of stress in its Federal Housing
Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992
200
(FHEFSSA). FHEFSSA established a new Office of Federal
Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) within the Department of Housing and Urban Development as the prudential
regulator in charge of monitoring the capital adequacy and
safety and soundness of the two major government-sponsored
housing entities (GSEs): Federal National Mortgage Associa194. LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE
FOR BANK AND THRIFT REGULATION

S&L DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS
128–31 (1991).

195. Id. at 67–72.
196. The liberalization of the asset restrictions would, the FHLBB hoped,
allow thrifts to achieve the required rates of return with higher-yielding assets
that they would need to retain fleeing, and attract new, deposits. Id. at 72–74.
197. See Investment Portfolio Policy and Accounting Guidelines, 54 Fed.
Reg. 23,457, 23,461, 23,471 (May 19, 1989).
198. FED. HOME LOAN BANK BD., THRIFT BULL. NO. 12, MORTGAGE DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS AND MORTGAGE SWAPS (1988) [hereinafter THRIFT BULLETIN
NO. 12], available at http://www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/ots/bulletins/
rescinded-thrift-bulletins/ots-tb-12.pdf.
199. Id. at 2.
200. Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, ch. XIII, Pub. L.
102-550, 106 Stat. 3672, 3941–4012 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C).
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tion (known as Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mort201
gage Corporation (known as Freddie Mac). The Act required
OFHEO to conduct a simple, periodic scenario test to “measure[] risk in the context of a company’s overall portfolio, includ202
ing the company’s risk management activities.” Congress re203
ferred to the scenario as a “stress period.”
Under the FHEFSSA stress testing regime, OFHEO would
determine the amount of capital each GSE would need to survive a ten-year scenario characterized by large credit losses,
large swings in interest rates, and other adverse conditions impacting the assets, liabilities, and off-balance sheet obligations
204
of the GSEs.
The test would project cash flows from the
GSEs’ assets, liabilities, and off-balance sheet obligations and
produce monthly balance sheets for the 120 months of the
205
stress test period. A GSE would “pass” the stress test, and
therefore avoid intrusive interventions by OFHEO, by ensuring
a positive total capital position throughout the simulated ten206
year adverse period of adverse conditions.
201. Id. §§ 1311–1319G.
202. Organization and Functions, 68 Fed. Reg. 32,627, 32,627 (June 2,
2003); see also Press Release, Office of Fed. Housing Enter. Oversight, OFHEO
Issues Risk-Based Capital Stress Test Results for Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac 4 (June 27, 2002) [hereinafter OFHEO Stress Testing Press Release],
available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/2240/62702stresstestresults.pdf
(“OFHEO is among the first financial institution regulators to use its own
stress test to determine capital adequacy.”).
203. See OFHEO Stress Testing Press Release, supra note 202, at 14.
204. Risk-Based Capital, 66 Fed. Reg. 47,730, 47,730–31 (Sept. 13, 2001).
205. Risk-Based Capital, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,850, 11,850 (Mar. 15, 2002).
206. Technically, the GSEs would need to maintain 130% of the total capital required to provide for the extra capital buffer on account of “management
and operations risk.” The stress test results were incorporated directly into the
machinery of the capital adequacy rules. Under FHEFSSA, the GSEs would be
required to maintain core capital of 2.5 percent of assets plus 0.45% of adjusted off-balance sheet obligations and total capital in an amount at least equal
to the risk-based capital level. Housing and Community Development Act
§§ 1361, 1362, & 1364. As used in FHEFSSA, “core capital” consists of common and preferred stocks, paid-in capital, and retained earnings; and “total
capital” consists of core capital plus a general (i.e., not applicable to specific
provisioned-for losses) foreclosure loss allowance and “any other amounts from
sources of funds available to absorb losses incurred by the [GSE]” that the
OFHEO director “by regulation determines are appropriate to include in determining total capital.” Id. § 1303(4), (18). The “risk-based capital level” (also
referred to as “stress test capital” in OFHEO’s implementing rule) for a GSE
was the amount of capital that would enable the GSE to survive the 10-year
stress test plus 30 percent of that amount to provide for “management and operations risk.” Id. § 1361(c); Risk-Based Capital, 66 Fed. Reg. 47,730, 47,731
(Sept. 13, 2001).
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It might seem surprising to learn of congressional innovation with avant-garde financial regulatory techniques with respect to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. After all, when the housing bubble burst in 2007 nearly three decades after the passage
of FHEFSSA, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were leveraged sixty-to-one and were placed into conservatorship where they
racked up billion-dollar quarterly losses on the taxpayer’s
207
dime.
Closer examination reveals that although the GSE
208
stress tests can be characterized as novel, their effectiveness
was handicapped by familiar shortcomings of assuranceoriented stress testing methods.
Consider, for example, that: (1) OFHEO, not the GSEs, was
responsible for conducting the tests, so no local knowledge was
209
harnessed and GSE corporate governance was unaffected; (2)
the test was applied with respect to the GSEs’ asset portfolios
210
as they existed at a fixed point in time; (3) the variables that
were stressed and, in many cases, the methodologies by which
they were stressed, were also fixed, specified in FHEFSSA it211
self; (4) the stress scenarios were drawn from historical precedents, meaning that the stress test assumed, at least with re212
spect to any single variable, that the worst was in the past;
207. See VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL., GUARANTEED TO FAIL: FANNIE MAE,
FREDDIE MAC, AND THE DEBACLE OF MORTGAGE FINANCE 23–27 (2011).
208. Technically, FHEFSSA was not the trailblazer in establishing regular,
periodic stress testing of financial institutions as a component of supervision.
In 1991, Congress had already instructed the Farm Credit Administration to
establish an Office of Secondary Market Oversight (OSMO) and to direct the
OSMO to develop and administer a similar test to the Federal Agricultural
Mortgage Corporation (known as Farmer Mac). See Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act Amendments of 1991 § 503, Pub. L. No. 102-237, 105
Stat. 1818, 1870–72 (1991) (inserting new section 8.32 in the Farm Credit Act
of 1971).
209. OFHEO Stress Testing Press Release, supra note 202, at 4.
210. Id. at 5.
211. See, e.g., Risk-Based Capital, 66 Fed. Reg. 47,730, 47,732 (Sept. 13,
2001) (noting, for example, that FHEFSSA prescribes credit losses and rises
and falls in baseline interest rates to be used in the stress test).
212. OFHEO’s treatment of haircuts illustrates this historicity bias. When
simulating the stress test’s effects on the GSEs’ balance sheets, FHEFSSA instructed OFHEO to give the GSEs credit for cash payments that would be received during the stress period from counterparties to GSE contracts, such as
mortgage insurance companies and derivatives counterparties. See Risk-Based
Capital, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,850, 11,850 (Mar. 15, 2002). However, because the
ability of counterparties to pay the GSEs contracted-for cash payments would
be adversely affected by the simulated conditions of the stress test, OFHEO
provided for percentage-based “haircuts,” or discounts, to the value of the cash
payments. Id. OFHEO determined the rates of counterparty default and the
severity levels of the defaults (i.e., the amount of loss a GSE would suffer from
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(5) variables were isolated and they did not interact dynamical213
ly; and (6) the outcome of the test was a binary pass-fail veri214
fication that did not prompt further action. Moreover, by tying the stress test exercise directly to a capital adequacy
regime that required compliance with precise rules, Congress
entrenched an adversarial, top-down regulatory relationship.
OFHEO’s responses to the GSEs’ comments, published in the
Federal Register, reflect a consistently adversarial relationship
in which the GSEs, perceiving that increases to capital requirements would reduce their return on equity, advocated at
nearly every juncture for the attenuation of the stressed condi215
tions used in the tests. “Stress” was a periodically negotiated
event rather than a continuous subject of deliberation within
216
the firm and between the firm and its regulators. During these one-off negotiations, the regulator was deliberating on
stressed conditions, and the regulated entity minimized threats
217
in order to achieve lower capital requirements.
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRESS TESTING REGULATION FROM
1990-2006
Throughout the 1990s and the first part of the 2000s,
stress testing regulation was, with one notable exception, characterized by either assurance-oriented stress testing or a
vagueness that defies ready categorization along the deliberation-assurance binary. These regulatory interventions occurred
in two principal contexts: regulation pertaining to derivatives
risk management and regulation pertaining to capital adequa218
cy. As with all of bank supervisory policy during this period,
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision—the international bank regulatory policy coordinator—played an important
a default, taking into account, e.g., foreclosure sales of collateral) using data
from the Great Depression. Id. at 11,851–52.
213. Id.
214. Risk-Based Capital, 66 Fed. Reg. 47,730, 47,732 (Sept. 13, 2001). The
point is that the capital requirement is either met (i.e., the GSE has sufficient
capital in light of the test) or it is not met (i.e., the GSE lacks sufficient capital
in light of the test). If the latter, then the GSE must raise additional capital,
but there is no follow-up discussion about, for example, what is causing the
lack of adequate capitalization or how might those causes be mitigated.
215. Risk-Based Capital, 66 Fed. Reg. 47,730, 47,736 (Sept. 13, 2001).
216. See, e.g., id. at 47,742.
217. See id. at 47,741–42.
218. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES FOR DERIVATIVES ¶¶ III.2, 8, 14 (1994) [hereinafter BASEL RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc211.pdf.
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219

role. With the exception of the so-called 1996 market risk
amendments to the capital adequacy rules, regulators moved
haltingly into this area of regulatory policy, stopping well short
of articulating a regulatory vision of deliberation-oriented
stress testing. Instead, notwithstanding the promising market
risk amendment approach to stress testing, banks during this
period used stress tests almost exclusively as an assurance tool,
in the process missing key signals of the impending financial
crisis.
In 1993, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC), which supervises federal chartered national banks, is220
sued Circular No. 277. The circular was noteworthy because
with it the OCC made the first attempt at a comprehensive set
of risk management guidelines in connection with burgeoning
derivatives activities by banks. The OCC directed bank management to, among other things, “facilitate stress testing” in
order to “evaluate risk exposures under various scenarios that
represent a broad range of potential market movements and
corresponding price behaviors and that consider historical and
221
recent market trends.” A year later, the Basel Committee
published its own guidance on risk management for derivatives
activities, mentioning quantitative and qualitative stress tests
that “identif[y] possible events or changes in market behavior
that could have unfavourable effects on the institution and [as222
sess] the ability of the institution to withstand them.” The
Basel Committee reiterated this guidance the following year in
a joint report it published with the International Organization
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), instructing bank supervisors to require “[i]nstitutions with significant trading books [to]
subject their portfolios on a regular basis to stress tests using
223
various assumptions and scenarios.” In 1996, the OCC published special guidance concerning credit derivatives and again
emphasized the importance of stress testing to “evaluate the

219. Id. at Preface ¶ 1; BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, FRAMEWORK FOR SUPERVISORY INFORMATION ABOUT THE DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES OF
BANKS AND SECURITIES FIRMS 12 (1995) [hereinafter BASEL DERIVATIVES
FRAMEWORK], available at https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs19.htm.
220. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANKING CIRCULAR
NO. 277, RISK MANAGEMENT OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES (1993).
221. Id. at 13.
222. BASEL RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 218, at ¶III.6.
223. BASEL DERIVATIVES FRAMEWORK , supra note 219, at 12.
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bank’s exposure in a highly stressed market scenario.” The
following year, in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian crises, the
OCC issued supplemental guidance that specifically addressed
225
examiner and board-level oversight of stress testing. In 1998,
the Basel Committee and IOSCO updated their 1995 derivatives supervision report by providing some examples of scenari226
os supervisors might require banks to run.
The vagueness of these references to stress testing in the
early derivatives risk management guidance contrasts somewhat with the later, more elaborate treatment of stress testing
in the Basel Committee-led restructuring of capital adequacy
regulation. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Basel
227
Committee radically reworked capital adequacy regulation by
permitting banks to set their minimum regulatory capital levels by reference to their proprietary statistical models such as
228
VaR. The Basel Committee initially extended such treatment
in 1996 to the market risk capital charge—i.e., the amount of
capital held against losses on derivatives and other securities
229
that the bank does not expect to hold to term. As a precondition to usage of this new VaR-based market risk capital adequacy regime, banks’ risk management systems had to satisfy
certain requirements, including having in place a “rigorous and
230
comprehensive stress testing program.” The Basel Committee
specifically mentioned historical and hypothetical scenario
231
analysis and sensitivity analysis.
Most interestingly, the
224. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULLETIN
NUMBER 1996-43, GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL BANKS (1996), available at
http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/1996/bulletin-1996-43.html.
225. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, RISK MANAGEMENT
OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES (1997), available at http://www.occ.gov/pub
lications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/deriv.pdf.
226. INT’L ORG. OF SECURITIES COMM’NS & BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, FRAMEWORK FOR SUPERVISORY INFORMATION ABOUT DERIVATIVES
AND TRADING ACTIVITIES 12 (1998), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbs39.pdf.
227. Capital adequacy rules require banks to maintain minimum amounts
of loss-absorbent capital, such as common equity, to serve as a cushion against
unanticipated losses. See Robert F. Weber, New Governance, Financial Regulation, and Challenges to Legitimacy: The Example of the Internal Models Approach to Capital Adequacy Regulation, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 783, 789 (2010).
228. See id. at 807–11.
229. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, AMENDMENT TO THE
CAPITAL ACCORD TO INCORPORATE MARKET RISKS 5–6 (2005), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs119.pdf.
230. Id. at 42–43.
231. Id.
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Committee believed that “stress tests should be both of a quantitative and qualitative nature” and that they should address,
in addition to first-order market losses, the “liquidity aspects of
232
market disturbances.” The Committee tied the “qualitative
criteria” to deliberation-oriented stress testing themes of (1)
use of imagination to identify threats to firm objectives; (2)
regular communication of test results to senior management
and the board of directors; and (3) dialogue with regulators:
Qualitative criteria should emphasize that two major goals of stress
testing are to evaluate the capacity of the bank’s capital to absorb potential large losses and to identify steps the bank can take to reduce
its risk and conserve capital. This assessment is integral to setting
and evaluating the bank’s management strategy and the results of
stress testing should be routinely communicated to senior management and, periodically, to the bank’s board of directors.
....
. . . Moreover, if the testing reveals particular vulnerability to a given
set of circumstances, the national authorities would expect the bank
233
to take prompt steps to manage those risks appropriately . . . .

Later that same year, U.S. bank regulators implemented
the market risk capital adequacy regime, but they did not specify how the stress tests were to be conducted, leaving it instead
234
to industry to develop best practices for stress testing. Four
years later in 2000, the OCC published related guidance on
model validation that impliedly touched on stress tests by mentioning the importance of “understanding . . .a model’s
235
strengths and weaknesses.”
When the Basel Committee extended this internal models
approach to the credit and operational risk capital charges in
2004, it again reiterated that the statistical models being used
to generate required minimum capital levels would need to be
236
subjected to stress testing. With this reform, known as “Basel
II” to distinguish it from the initial 1988 Basel Accord on credit
risk, the Committee took a step back from deliberation-oriented

232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See Risk-Based Capital Standards: Market Risk, 61 Fed. Reg. 47,358,
47,363 (Sept. 6, 1996).
235. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULL. NO.
2000-16, MODEL VALIDATION 2 (2000), available at http://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/
media/resources/3676/occ-bl2000-16_risk_model_validation.pdf.
236. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS 205, 207–08
(2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf.
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237

stress testing.
Basel II required banks to have in place
“sound stress testing processes” that identify “unfavourable ef238
fects on a [bank]’s credit exposures.” Moreover, the reform
imposed a new requirement: banks would have to design and
perform a sensitivity analysis—labeled the “credit risk stress
239
test”—subject to regulatory supervision.
The Committee’s
guidance on the test, however, was hesitant and assurancefocused. For instance, it noted that “the objective is not to require banks to consider worst-case scenarios” and that the test
“should . . . consider at least the effect of mild recession scenarios” such as “two consecutive quarters of zero growth to assess
240
the effect on the banks’ [credit exposure].” Compared with the
Committee’s earlier treatment of market risk stress testing requirements, the Committee’s conservatism in the credit risk
context is apparent.
The middle-of-decade period marks an inflection point in
the history of regulatory engagement with stress testing. Regulators intermittently touched on stress testing in guidance to
supervised institutions. For instance, U.S. bank regulators responded to signs of a bubble in commercial real estate in 2006
by publishing guidance encouraging, but neither requiring nor
prescribing specific methodologies for, banks to conduct portfolio-level stress tests so as to “quantify the impact of changing
241
economic scenarios on asset quality, earnings, and capital.”
During this period, regulators discovered that their ability
to foster effective stress testing systems within banks had fall242
en well short of their expectations. In 2006, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB)—the lead U.S.
regulator for bank holding company groups—reviewed bank
243
stress testing practices at large, complex banking groups. The
FRB conducted the study to facilitate its institutional understanding of the full range of stress testing practices, an urgent
task because “there was neither a well-developed set of best
244
practices nor supervisory guidance in this area at the time.”
The study found that none of the banking groups had an inte237. Id. at 2–5.
238. Id. at 266.
239. Id. at 96–97.
240. Id.
241. Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending, Sound Risk Management Practices, 71 Fed. Reg. 2302, 2307 (Jan. 13, 2006).
242. GAO Risk Management Oversight Assessment, supra note 116, at 4.
243. Id. at 23.
244. See id.
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grated stress testing program that incorporated all major fi245
nancial risks on an enterprise-wide basis.
Instead, banks
were stress testing the impact of adverse events on individual
products and business lines rather than on the institution as a
whole and missing any dynamic interaction among risk factors
246
or portfolio exposures.
Even more troubling, none of the
groups were regularly conducting worst-case scenario analysis
247
involving insolvency scenarios.
A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report summarizing the FRB study reads like a tutorial on how an assuranceoriented stress testing approach, and the corresponding deemphasis of active deliberation, can overwhelm both regulators
and risk management departments:
[O]fficials told us that the current crisis had gone beyond what they
had contemplated for a worst-case scenario, and they said that they
would probably have faced significant resistance had they tried to require the institutions to do stress tests for scenarios such as downgrades in counterparties’ credit ratings because such scenarios appeared unlikely. Other regulators raised concerns about stress testing
at individual institutions, but we did not find evidence that they had
effectively changed the firms’ stress testing practices. In the materials
we reviewed, one regulator recommended that the institution include
worst-case scenarios in its testing. In a 2005 examination report, examiners noted a concern about the level of senior management oversight of risk tolerances. This concern primarily stemmed from lack of
documentation, stress testing, and communication of firm risk tolerances and the extent to which these were reflected in stress tests.
While the firm later took steps to document formal risk tolerances
and communicate this throughout the firm, the recommendation re248
lated to stress testing remained open through 2008.

A 2005 study conducted by a committee at the Bank for International Settlements found that the overwhelming majority
of stress tests were being conducted on trading portfolios alone,
249
and that stress testing of credit exposures lagged behind.
Banks had made little progress at all in stress testing liquidity
250
needs. The preponderant use of stress tests remained model
251
validation. A joint FRB-OCC horizontal review of model validation practices at large banks found that bank practices were
deficient even for this basic assurance-oriented stress testing
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. at 4.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 22–24.
Id. at 24.
BIS, STRESS TESTING PAPER, supra note 59, at 9, 14.
Id. at 14; Taleb et al., supra note 165, at 5.
BIS, STRESS TESTING PAPER, supra note 59, at 5.
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252

function. When testifying before Congress in 2009, former
Chief National Examiner for the OCC levied a sobering assessment of the extent of managerial deliberation on stress:
As with most other issues, the success of a stress testing program depends importantly on the support and sponsorship provided by senior
management. In banks where risk management functions did not perform well, stress testing typically was a mechanical exercise. Management viewed stress tests as more of a ‘‘requirement’’ than an important risk management tool that could lead to internal discussions
and debate about whether existing exposures constituted unaccepta253
ble risks.

These inadequacies in stress testing practices contributed to
the financial crisis that started in 2007 and persists today in
254
the form of a debt overhang, particularly in Europe.
C. A NEW PHASE OF POST-2008 STRESS TESTING REGULATION
Following the recent financial crisis, stress testing regulation has been characterized by two trends that have little in
255
common beyond their invocation of the stress test label. On
the one hand, regulators have redoubled their isolated, “one256
off” regulator-conducted stress tests. Regulators initiated this
process, and Congress subsequently enshrined it as a mandatory, periodic feature of U.S. bank supervision in the Dodd-Frank
257
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. In
the European Union, regulators’ use of stress remains more ad
258
hoc, though not less prevalent. On the other hand, bank regulators, under the auspices of the Basel Committee, registered
their collective failure to embed deliberation-oriented stress
testing norms into the corporate governance infrastructure of

252. GAO Risk Management Oversight Assessment, supra note 116, at 21
(finding banks “lacked requirements for model testing, clearly defined roles
and responsibilities for testing, adequate detail for the scope or frequency of
validation, and a specific process for correcting problems identified during validation”).
253. Long Statement, supra note 45, at 75.
254. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR ENHANCING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2, 4–5 (2010), available at http://www
.bis.org/publ/bcbs176.pdf.
255. See infra Part IV.C.1–2.
256. See infra Part IV.C.1.
257. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
§ 165(i), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1430 (2010).
258. Huw Jones, BoE’s Cunliffe Says EU Banks Tests Must Be Credible,
REUTERS (March 4, 2014), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/04/uk-britain
-boe-cunliffe-idUKBREA230S920140304.
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regulated banks and provided more detailed guidance. The
former trend is solidly an assurance-related effort, and the latter trend is a more ambitious, if undeveloped, deliberationrelated effort.
1. Regulator-Conducted Assurance-Oriented Stress Testing
The regulator-conducted stress testing initiatives are a
transatlantic phenomenon, and are characterized by several of
the hallmarks of assurance-oriented stress testing: partial equilibrium assumptions; static scenarios; precise estimation; and
sensitivity to audience perception. In the United States, the
early 2009 Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP)
saw U.S. bank regulators conduct a highly publicized, isolated,
“one-off” stress test of the nineteen largest bank holding companies. The tests were designed to gauge whether firms would
remain sufficiently capitalized in the event of a regulator260
designed “worse than expected” recession scenario. This adverse scenario tracked real GDP, unemployment and housing
261
prices. If the results demonstrated to regulators that an additional capital buffer was warranted, the banks would be required to raise capital from private investors or, that failing,
262
the U.S. Treasury. Regulators openly admitted that this was
not a typical supervisory exercise to gauge banking resilience,
and instead was designed in large part in the service of trans263
parency and bolstering confidence. To many in the financial
community, the stress tests’ purpose was plainly to reassure
264
the public of the solvency of the sector.
259. See infra Part IV.C.2.
260. See Timothy Geithner, How We Tested the Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 2009, at A33.
261. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE SUPERVISORY
CAPITAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 6 (2009),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/bcreg20090424a1.pdf.
262. Press Release, Joint Statement by the Treasury, FDIC, OCC, OTS,
and the Federal Reserve (Feb. 23, 2009), available at http://www.federal
reserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20090223a.htm. The results of the stress
tests suggested that the 19 banks would stand to lose about $600 billion in the
event the severe scenario materialized. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE SUPERVISORY CAPITAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: OVERVIEW OF
RESULTS 3 (2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
press/bcreg/bcreg20090507a1.pdf.
263. See, e.g., Geithner, supra note 260, at A33.
264. See Andrews & Dash, supra note 7, at B4 (quoting a banking analyst’s
opinion that bank regulators “are designing [the stress tests] to make it sound
like the banking system is in great shape”).
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Since 2011, the Dodd-Frank Act has required the FRB to
conduct annual stress tests—which form part of the FRB’s new
Regulation YY and are referred to as “Dodd-Frank Act Stress
Tests” or “DFASTs”—of bank holding companies with total consolidated assets greater than $50 billion and financial institu265
tions designated by the FSOC as systemically significant.
266
Subject companies are referred to as “covered companies.”
The DFAST program projects revenues, expenses, losses, and
the resulting post-stress capital ratios based on three hypothetical scenarios of increasing degrees of adverseness: a baseline
scenario, an adverse scenario, and a severely adverse scenar267
io. The FRB applies the scenarios in a rigid and uniform
268
manner to all subject companies.
269
As noted earlier, the Dodd-Frank Act also mandated that
covered companies conduct their own DFAST semi-annual
stress tests in the first and third quarters (the FRB refers to
the third-quarter tests as “mid-cycle” to distinguish them from
270
the first-quarter tests). Regulation YY requires covered companies to use the FRB’s own scenarios when conducting annual
271
stress tests. As such, the company-conducted, first-quarter
stress test amounts to little more than an arithmetic verifica272
tion exercise. By contrast, the covered companies themselves
are responsible for formulating the scenarios used in the mid265. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(a), (i)(1) (2012). The institutions subject to these
tests are identical to the set of institutions subject to the internal stress testing requirement. See supra note 8.
266. 12 C.F.R. § 252.132(e) (2013).
267. 12 C.F.R. § 252.132 (2013); BD. OF GOVERNORS. OF THE FED. RESERVE
SYS., DODD-FRANK ACT STRESS TEST 2013: SUPERVISORY STRESS TEST METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 2 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 DFAST RESULTS], available
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/dfast_2013_results_
20130314.pdf.
268. 2013 DFAST RESULTS, supra note 267, at 3.
269. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
270. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., DODD-FRANK ACT
MID-CYCLE STRESS TESTS 2013: SUMMARY INSTRUCTIONS (2013), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20130513a1.pdf.
271. See 12 C.F.R. § 252.144(b) (2013); Supervisory and Company-Run
Stress Test Requirements for Covered Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,378, 62,387
(Oct 12, 2012) (“For the annual stress test, covered companies will use the
same scenarios as the Board will use for its supervisory stress analysis.”).
272. It might be objected that the timing of the provision of the results of
the annual stress tests makes the requirement more meaningful. Covered
companies must provide their results to the FRB by January 5, but the FRB
must publish its results only by March 31. Id. at 62,383 tbl.1. As a result, the
FRB obtains insight into the covered company’s general orientation toward the
stress testing exercise.
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273

cycle stress tests.
As with the regulator-conducted stress
tests, the scenarios must consist, at a minimum, of a baseline
scenario, an adverse scenario, and a severely adverse scenar274
io. Covered companies are to disclose publicly their pro forma
capital levels in the event, however unlikely, that the scenarios
275
come to pass.
The FRB instructions to firms for the mid-cycle tests are,
in marked contrast to the prescriptive, top-down approach to
the first-quarter tests, open-ended and indeterminate:
The Board anticipates that covered companies may use a variety of
quantitative and qualitative approaches to develop the scenarios. The
adverse and severely adverse scenarios used in mid-cycle stress tests
should reflect a company’s unique vulnerabilities to factors that affect
its firm-wide activities and risk exposures, including macroeconomic,
market-wide, and firm-specific events. The Board expects the companies to consider their own risk profiles and operations in designing
276
specific elements of the adverse and severely adverse scenarios.

As with all open-ended regulatory dictates, its effectiveness
will depend on the vigor with which the FRB engages with
bank management. If these discussions are robust, it should be
expected that the FRB-formulated scenarios will be improved.
The track record of regulators on this score is not good, though
the optimist might see substantial room for improvement.
The results of the DFAST tests are taken into account in a
277
subsequent capital plan review
process during which the
278
FRB evaluates each covered company’s capital plan. Specifi273. 12 C.F.R. § 252.145(b) (2013).
274. See Supervisory and Company-Run Stress Test Requirements for Covered Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. at 62,387.
275. Id. at 62,379. Because this is a forward-looking computation, the rule
incorporates assumptions with respect to dividends, repurchases, redemptions, and additional capital raises during the prospective period over which
the test spans.
276. Id. at 62,387.
277. The capital plan review grows out of, and integrates as a regular feature of banking supervision, the FRB’s initial Comprehensive Capital Analysis
and Review (CCAR), conducted in 2010. With the CCAR, the FRB assessed the
capital adequacy and the internal capital planning processes of the same
large, complex bank holding companies that participated in the 2009 SCAP
stress test exercise. Policy Statement on the Scenario Design Framework for
Stress Testing, 77 Fed. Reg. 70,124, 70,124–25 (Nov. 23, 2012).
278. The FRB requires covered companies to submit annual capital plans
for consideration by the FRB. Capital Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 74,631, 74,633–34
(Dec. 1, 2011). The mandatory elements of a capital plan organize into four
components:
(i) an assessment of the expected uses and sources of capital over the
planning horizon (at least nine quarters, beginning with the quarter
preceding the quarter in which the bank holding company submits its
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cally, the FRB assesses whether the covered companies have
robust, forward-looking capital planning processes and have
sufficient capital to continue operations throughout times of
economic and financial stress. If, after consideration of, among
other things, the DFAST results, the FRB does not approve of
the capital plan, the covered company is prohibited from engag279
ing in any “capital distribution.” Under the capital plan review program, the FRB requires that covered companies maintain a minimum 5% core tier 1 capital ratio even under the
280
severely adverse scenario.
If the covered company cannot
demonstrate its ability to meet that standard, the FRB will re281
ject its capital plan. This power expands the FRB’s formal arsenal beyond its traditional powers under the prompt corrective
282
action regime in place since 1992. The capital plan review
and the DFAST program represent a substantial strengthening
of previous approaches to assessing capital adequacy and promoting best practices at large banks for measuring capital
283
needs and for managing and allocating capital resources.
capital plan) that reflects the bank holding company’s size, complexity, risk profile, and scope of operations, assuming both expected and
stressful conditions; (ii) a detailed description of the bank holding
company’s process for assessing capital adequacy; (iii) the bank holding company’s capital policy; and (iv) a discussion of any expected
changes to the bank holding company’s business plan that are likely
to have a material impact on the firm’s capital adequacy or liquidity.
Id. at 74,634. The rule requires each covered company capital plan to consider
the effects of, in addition to the FRB-formulated stress scenarios, at least one
stress scenario developed by the covered company itself. Id. at 74,635. The
FRB, after review of the capital plan, may approve the plan, disapprove the
plan, or require re-submission of the plan. Id. at 74,638–41; see also Policy
Statement on the Scenario Design Framework for Stress Testing, 77 Fed. Reg.
at 70,125 (noting that the capital plan review “ties the review of a bank holding company’s performance under stress scenarios to its ability to make capital
distributions”).
279. For purposes of its capital plan review rule, the FRB defines “capital
distribution” as “a redemption or repurchase of any debt or equity capital instrument, a payment of common or preferred stock dividends, a payment that
may be temporarily or permanently suspended by the issuer on any instrument that is eligible for inclusion in the numerator of any minimum regulatory capital ratio, and any similar transaction that the Federal Reserve determines to be in substance a distribution of capital.” Id. at 74,637.
280. BD. OF GOVERNORS. OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS AND REVIEW 2013: ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK AND RESULTS 11
(2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/
ccar-2013-results-20130314.pdf.
281. See supra note 278.
282. See Weber, supra note 10, at 717 n.287.
283. Id. At present, the capital plan review applies to the nineteen largest
bank holding companies, while the DFAST program applies to a broader range
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In 2010, European Union (EU) authorities established the
European Banking Authority (EBA) as an EU-level banking
supervisor and charged it with, among other things, adminis284
tering EU-wide stress tests on EU-domiciled banks. The EU
lawmaking institutions created the EBA to replace the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), which had
been created in 2004 to encourage supervisory coordination and
information sharing among EU member state bank supervisors
and promote consistent implementation of EU banking laws
285
and regulation. As problems in peripheral EU state banking
sectors attracted attention, CEBS conducted an initial round of
stress tests in May of 2009 that modeled gross domestic prod286
uct, unemployment rates, and real estate market prices. The
CEBS conducted a second round of tests in 2010 and the newly
287
formed EBA conducted its first round of tests in 2011. The
EU stress tests operate similarly to the FRB’s capital plan review program; banks were required in July 2011 to raise additional core tier 1 capital to the extent that they would have less
288
than 5% core tier 1 capital ratio under the adverse scenario.
In December of 2011, the EBA raised its required threshold to

of institutions based on the statutory threshold. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Stress Tests and Capital Planning, (Feb. 25,
2014), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/stress-tests
-capital-planning.htm.
284. See Council Regulation 1093/2010, art. 20(2)(b), 2010 O.J. (L 331) 12,
29 (EU). Specifically, the EBA stress tests are intended “to assess the resilience of financial institutions . . . to adverse market developments, and [and to]
evaluate the potential for systemic risk to increase in situations of stress, ensuring that a consistent methodology is applied at the national level to such
tests.” Id. As of mid-2013, there is speculation that the EBA will be dissolved
in connection with the creation of a Eurozone-wide banking union. Patrick
Jenkins, European Banks Lift Capital Buffers, FIN. TIMES, July 12, 2012, at
16.
285. About CEBS, CEBS Archive, EUROPEAN BANKING AUTHORITY, http://
www.eba.europa.eu/cebs-archive (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).
286. Press Release, Comm. of Eur. Banking Supervisors, Results of the EUWide Stress Testing Exercise, (Oct. 1, 2009) available at http://www.eba
.europa.eu/documents/10180/15977/CEBS-2009-180-Annex-2-%28Press
-release-from-CEBS%29.PDF.
287. EUR. BANKING AUTH., 2011 EU-WIDE STRESS TESTS: AGGREGATE RESULTS 3 (2011) [hereinafter AGGREGATE RESULTS], available at http://www.eba
.europa.eu/documents/10180/15935/EBA_ST_2011_Summary_Report_v6.pdf/
54a9ec8e-3a44-449f-9a5f-e820cc2c2f0a.
288. Id. at 38.
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9%, making it decidedly more stringent than the U.S. capital
289
plan review.
These stress tests illustrate several shortcomings with assurance-oriented stress testing. The first shortcoming is a danger against which all stress tests should guard: undue optimism. For example, the dire scenario regulators presented as a
“more adverse scenario” in the February 2009 SCAP program
290
appeared anodyne by April of 2009. The 2010 CEBS stress
test exercise in Europe gave a clean bill of health to all but seven of the ninety-one tested banks, identifying an aggregate cap291
ital shortfall of only €3.5 billion. Four months later, the European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and
the European Union announced a bailout of Ireland that allocated €10 billion—and made available another €25 billion—to
292
recapitalize the banks of Ireland alone! Furthermore, Greek
banks and Spanish cajas (savings banks) passed the 2010
CEBS stress tests, just months before requiring unprecedented
293
levels of public assistance. Banks from the most recent Eurozone bailout recipient, Cyprus, passed the stress tests in 2010
and 2011 because the adverse scenario did not contemplate the
294
possibility of losses on government bonds. This was no minor
omission; the primary cause of uncertainty in the banking sec295
tor at the time was exposure to sovereign bonds. The Franco289. Patrick Jenkins, Pretending the World Is Fixed Is a Gamble, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 26, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7cc387cc-775c-11e1-93cb
-00144feab49a.html.
290. See Wessel, supra note 2, at A2.
291. Patrick Jenkins & Brooke Masters, Bank Watchdog Sets out to Square
the Circle, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d70dd886
-3865-11e0-959c-00144feabdc0.html.
292. See Patrick Jenkins, Bail-out Document Runs Dry on Tackling Liquidity Issue, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2010, at 20.
293. See David Enrich, New Doubts on EU Bank Stress Tests, WALL ST. J.,
July 20, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527487047200
04575377202517842246 (noting that stress tests by market researchers at another bank estimated that the cajas alone would face a €50 billion shortfall in
the event of a severe downturn).
294. David Enrich & Charles Forelle, Greek Bets Sank Top Lenders, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 27, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873
23501004578386762342123182.
295. Patrick Jenkins, Power to the Regulators, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2011,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c1266a8a-24e4-11e1-8bf9-00144feabdc0.html
(“When the EBA ran [its 2011] stress test[s] . . . it applied bleak forecasts for
what might happen to European economic growth, unemployment and property prices, but in the face of political hostility from European Union leaders, it
stopped short of applying market valuations of peripheral sovereign debt—
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Belgian bank Dexia passed the 2011 stress test, only to require
France and Belgium to assure investors of their readiness to
296
guarantee Dexia’s obligations three months later. Eventually,
in December of 2011, the EBA updated its stress tests to take
297
into account a modest loss on sovereign bond holdings. Excessive optimism is not limited to scenario design. The U.S. capital
plan review program’s requirement that covered companies
maintain tier 1 capital ratios of 5%, after all, sets a bar that is
actually lower than the Basel III capital ratios that U.S. bank
298
regulators agreed to implement by 2015.
A second shortcoming, which is related to the first, flows
from having hybrid intended audiences: on the one hand, the
tests were designed to advert supervisors to problem institutions. But on the other hand, they were designed to communicate to markets and investors that the financial system was
299
sound. Several industry commentators had expressed skepticism about the “adversity” of the “more adverse scenario” on
300
these grounds. A Royal Bank of Scotland economist voiced
the concern, stating “If you do have the Greek banks pass the
tests, there may still be some skepticism in the markets about
whether or not they’ve been rigorous and whether they’ve been
301
a true test of the system.” Arguing in favor of “realistic” severe scenarios, Financial Times banking commentator Wolfgang Münchau discusses the tension between the political and
diagnostic functions of the EBA stress tests:
precisely the issue that was at the heart of investors nervousness about banks’
financial strength.”).
296. Jill Treanor, How Did Europe’s Bank Stress Tests Give Dexia a Clean
Bill of Health?, THE GUARDIAN BUSINESS BLOG (Oct. 5, 2011, 4:10 PM), http://
www.guardian.co.uk/business/blog/2011/oct/05/europe-bank-stress-tests-dexia.
297. Jenkins, supra note 295, at 14.
298. Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Basel III, Minimum Regulatory Capital Ratios, Capital Adequacy, Transition
Provisions, and Prompt Corrective Action, 77 Fed. Reg. 52,792, 52,824 tbl.9
(Aug. 30, 2012).
299. Jenkins & Masters, supra note 1 (“The EBA’s aims are twofold: first,
to strengthen the system by pushing banks that are thinly capitalised relative
to their underlying risks into raising fresh equity: and second, to convince the
world about that strength—helping investors, particularly from outside Europe, to differentiate among eurozone banks and stop shunning them en
masse.”).
300. See Andrews & Dash, supra note 7, at B1, B4 (reporting that a bank
analyst found the more adverse scenario assumptions “too optimistic” and
“[not] harsh enough”—in particular with respect to the expected growth to be
generated from 2009 federal stimulus spending).
301. Enrich, supra note 293.
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First, by realistic stress I mean the inclusion of extreme, not probable,
worst-case scenarios. Given the recent discussions about Greece, this
must include the worst estimates of a “haircut”—a deduction suffered
by bondholders—of about 50 per cent of the face value of Greek bonds.
The stress tests will, according to reports last week, include a uniform
haircut on sovereign bonds of 3 per cent. This number is a joke. Some
institutions will have a stronger exposure to Greece, Portugal, Ireland
or Spain than others, and it is important that those banks are
stressed on the assumption of significant haircuts of their sovereign
risk portfolios. I can see the politics behind the 3 per cent figure. It is
official EU policy to deny the reality that Greece might default or restructure. A genuine stress test might expose the EU’s position as indefensible. Those opposed to any inclusion of sovereign risk into the
stress tests argue that the mere assumption of a haircut might turn
into a self-fulfilling prophecy. The market would jump to the wrong
conclusions. This is a silly argument. Stress test scenarios are not
forecasts. They are only scenarios, of the kind that market partici302
pants have already factored into the pricing of bonds.

A third shortcoming is that the scenarios are drawn from
historical precedents. For example, in 2011 the EBA used loan
loss provision and profitability data from 2009 as a benchmark
303
in setting the “adverse” scenario. Historical scenarios are not
intrinsically suspect, and their use is a key part of any stress
testing program; to eliminate them would be to avoid learning
from history. Nevertheless, the regulatory imposition of a unitary scenario on all banks (as occurs under both the EBA and
DFAST test programs) means that banks and regulators are
not engaged in a dialogic, iterative process of scenario development that can harness the imagination of multiple actors. The
need to develop a scenario leads naturally to an overreliance on
historical precedents, which are identifiable, numerous, and as
to which regulators have reliable data.
A fourth shortcoming is that these stress tests are static
and assume partial equilibrium models of the financial system.
As a result, they do not capture vulnerabilities to liquidity
crunches and other more dynamic phenomena. The FRB
acknowledges that the DFAST tests are limited by their partial
equilibrium assumptions: “These projections incorporate a
number of conservative modeling assumptions, but do not make
explicit behavioral assumptions about the possible actions of a
BHC’s creditors and counterparties in the scenario, except
through the severely adverse scenario’s characterizations of fi302. Wolfgang Münchau, Europe Risks Failing the Real Test on Banks, FIN.
TIMES, Jul. 5, 2010, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a989f262-879b-11df-9f37
-00144feabdc0.html.
303. AGGREGATE RESULTS, supra note 287.
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nancial asset prices and economic activity.” These assurancerelated shortcomings limit the effectiveness of these otherwise
encouraging programs.
2. Basel Committee Principles: An Overture to DeliberationOriented Stress Testing?
While the global financial system was still in the throes of
the 2008 financial crisis, the Basel Committee published a series of stress testing “principles” to guide bank management
and bank supervisors in their efforts to promote effective stress
305
testing programs. Noting that it had already required banks
to maintain rigorous stress testing programs in place, the
Committee registered its disappointment with the track record
306
of stress testing. The document’s definition of stress test is
noteworthy: “A stress test is commonly described as the evaluation of a bank’s financial position under a severe but plausible
307
scenario to assist in decision making within the bank.” As
discussed at length in Part IV.B, it is, in light of the predominance of assurance-oriented stress testing regulatory efforts, an
exaggeration to describe the connection between stress testing
and firm decision-making as a “commonly” shared precept.
Nevertheless, in the document the Committee envisages a new
role for bank regulators that resonates with deliberationoriented stress testing. The supervisory principles are set forth
below, with brief descriptions of how they might be used to foster deliberation:
(1) Supervisors should make regular and comprehensive as308
sessments of a bank’s stress testing program. By regularly reviewing stress test programs and scenarios, regulators will be able (1)
to identify those “good actor” institutions that deliberate more actively on the possibilities or failure and (2) to present scenarios identified
by the good actors prospectively to institutions with assuranceoriented stress testing mindsets.
(2) Supervisors should require management to take corrective
action if material deficiencies in the stress testing program
are identified or if the results of stress tests are not adequate304. 2013 DFAST RESULTS, supra note 267.
305. BCBS, STRESS TESTING PRINCIPLES, supra note 46.
306. Id. at 1 (lamenting the failure of bank stress tests to “produce large
loss numbers in relation to their capital buffers . . . or their actual loss experience” and to “include[] more severe scenarios”); see also supra notes 230–41
and accompanying text (discussing the Committee’s actions to require rigorous
stress testing programs).
307. BCBS, STRESS TESTING PRINCIPLES, supra note 46, at 2.
308. Id. at 17.
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ly taken into consideration in the decision-making process.
Here, the Committee expressly links the stress testing program to decision-making and corporate governance. If stress testing is limited to
a verification process performed by risk management departments
without interaction with other business units, regulators should be
empowered to intervene.
(3) Supervisors should assess and, if necessary, challenge the
scope and severity of firm-wide scenarios, including by requiring reverse stress tests. The reference to reverse stress tests—
which intrinsically require active deliberation on the channels
310
through which failure might emerge —again suggests a deliberation-oriented stress testing approach.
(4) Supervisors should examine banks’ stress test results when
assessing whether banks have adequate capital and liquidity
on a forward-looking basis. The Committee notes that
“[s]upervisors should . . . be able to understand the rationale for management decisions to take or not to take remedial actions” in response
to the results of its stress tests. This again implies regular dialogue
with bank management concerning stress and failure and responses
thereto. With respect to liquidity risk management, which is, as discussed above, rarely susceptible to assurance-type modeling, the
Committee notes that regulators “should review the use of stress test
results to ensure that the potential impact on a bank’s liquidity is ful311
ly considered and discussed at senior management level.”
(5) Supervisors should be adequately resourced and technically able, and should engage in dialogue with other public authorities and industry to identify systemic vulnerabilities and
312
the ways in which they might unfold. The Committee states its
hope that regulators and industry engage in a “constructive, systematic dialogue” concerning “which scenarios could unfold and [which]
313
systemic interactions could crystallise.” If regulators have the ability and resources to contribute meaningfully to this dialogue, including by resisting tendencies to oversimplify, they will contribute to a
better understanding of the causal environment in which financial in314
stitutions operate.
309. Id.
310. See supra Part II.C.1.b.
311. BCBS, STRESS TESTING PRINCIPLES, supra note 46, at 19.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Each of these supervisory principles is explained in greater detail in
the Basel Committee document. See id. at 17–19. A sixth supervisory principle
instructs regulators to “consider implementing stress test exercises based on
common [regulator-provided] scenarios” so as to complement banks’ own internal stress tests and better enable regulators to understand the possible impact of specific stress events. Id. at 19. The EBA stress tests and the FRB postcrisis activities respond directly to this charge, see supra notes 264–68, 284
and accompanying text, but the Basel Committee emphasizes that these “supervisory stress tests should on their own not be considered as sufficient” and
that regulators “should make clear that these are not a substitute for stress
tests designed by bank management, given that a common supervisory scenar-
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These principles espouse expectations that bank regulators will
learn from the financial crisis and adopt a deliberation-oriented
stress testing approach. The OCC’s Chief Bank Examiner has
publicly touted the OCC’s role in developing these Basel princi315
ples. And the Basel Committee has reiterated them in subse316
quent publications. The EBA stress tests in Europe and the
DFAST and capital plan review program in the United States
demonstrate, however, that regulators have a long way to go to
operationalize the principles.
V. THREE PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE THE USE OF
REGULATION TO INSTITUTIONALIZE DELIBERATIONORIENTED STRESS TESTING
The limited progress to institutionalize deliberationoriented stress testing—both at the regulatory level and at the
industry level—is to some extent understandable. Deliberation
on remote possibilities of future contingent states, however cat317
astrophic, does not come naturally. Sociologist Carol Heimer
has coined the term “bounded imagination” to describe how
“people . . . have rather limited capacities to imagine alterna318
tives to the one that exists or that they have chosen.” The
problem is only exacerbated in bureaucratic environments with
multiple corporate actors, stakeholders, and goals—or where,
as with large global corporations, managers face competing
demands on their attention spans in a high-pressure environment.
The report on the 1986 space shuttle Challenger disaster
notes that when it came to formulating pre-launch estimates of
io [such as are provided in the DFAST exercise] is not tailored to the unique
characteristics of individual banks.” BCBS, STRESS TESTING PRINCIPLES, supra note 46, at 19.
315. See Long Statement, supra note 45, at 79.
316. See, e.g., BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, ENHANCEMENTS TO
THE BASEL II FRAMEWORK 25 (2009), available at https://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbs157.pdf (“Supervisors should assess the effectiveness of banks’ stress testing programme in identifying relevant vulnerabilities. Supervisors should review the key assumptions driving stress testing results and challenge their
continuing relevance in view of existing and potentially changing market conditions. Supervisors should challenge banks on how stress testing is used and
the way it affects decision-making. Where this assessment reveals material
shortcomings, supervisors should require a bank to detail a plan of corrective
action.”).
317. See PARKER, supra note 10, at 60–61.
318. Carol A. Heimer, Legislating Responsibility 25 (Am. Bar Found.,
Working Paper No. 9711, 1997).
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the probability of a loss of vehicle and of human life, the shuttle
engineers and the NASA management had wildly different in319
tuitions. The engineers, true to their safety-minded professional ethos, estimated odds of mission failure up to 1000 times
320
higher than those of managers. After discussing this discrepancy, the report poses the obvious question: “What is the cause
321
of management’s fantastic faith in the machinery?” Financial
regulators could pose a similar question with respect to managers at the firms they supervise: what is the cause of manage322
ment’s fantastic faith in their risk management systems?
More important for purposes of this Article, however, is the
likely follow-up question: “How can we use regulations in a
manner that encourages managers, like engineers, to deliberate
more actively on worst-case scenarios and, more generally, failure?” This Part takes up that question.
It goes without saying that using public regulatory power
to institutionalize deliberation-oriented stress testing within
financial firms presents unique challenges. The open-ended and
indeterminate character of its outputs is a poor fit for the tradi323
tional administrative agency’s toolkit. To combat this dilemma, regulators should bear in mind three themes in their dialogue with regulated firms over stress testing. First, they
should understand their task as involving management-based
regulation—a regulatory approach that acts on corporate planning processes rather than demanding specific technologies or
outputs. Second, they should encourage the further development of the “quantitative skepticism” that Anette Mikes, in her
field research with bank risk management departments, has
324
noted already exists in many large financial institutions. Deliberation-oriented stress testing will have an easier time gaining traction in a quantitatively skeptical risk management de325
partment. Third, regulators should draw from the examples
provided by HROs such as nuclear power plants, aircraft carri319. II PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON THE SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIREPORT TO THE PRESIDENT app. F, at F-1 (1986).
320. See id.
321. Id.
322. See BCBS, STRESS TESTING PRINCIPLES, supra note 46, at 2 (“Stress
testing practices at most banks . . . did not foster internal debate nor challenge
prior assumptions such as the cost, risk and speed with which new capital
could be raised or that positions could be hedged or sold.”).
323. See Weber, supra note 59, at 7.
324. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
DENT,
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ers, air traffic control systems, and wildfire-fighting units.
Management theorists have admired the ability of these HROs
to maintain reliable, resilient performance even in conditions of
326
uncertainty and volatility.
In other words, the success of
stress testing as a regulatory tool depends on whether regulat327
ed institutions implement HRO decision-making norms.
A. MANAGEMENT-BASED REGULATION: UNDERSTANDING WHY
STRESS TESTING MAKES SENSE AS A REGULATORY MECHANISM
The wellness of fit between a regulatory instrument and a
regulatory objective is a question that often goes underexamined in the rush to construct a regulatory solution to a
328
perceived market failure. Once the regulatory objective is determined, however, the choice of instrument is the most critical
329
task. While the appeal of stress and failure deliberation is intuitive, reflection on regulatory design—thinking about the
way we think about a regulatory tool—is indispensable.
Cary Coglianese and David Lazer present a typology of
regulatory mechanisms that is instructive in this context. They
describe a traditional dichotomy between technology-based
regulation (TBR) and performance-based regulation (PBR) that
dates to now-Justice Stephen Breyer’s academic administrative
330
law work. When administering TBR tools, regulators specify
331
techniques, procedures, and restrictions. When administering
332
PBR tools, regulators intervene at the output stage, as with
333
Pigouvian taxes. TBR tools are useful where the regulated
entities are relatively homogeneous and regulatory outputs—
i.e., the measure of social harm or good that prompted the regu334
latory intervention in the first place—are difficult to monitor.
By contrast, PBR tools work best where circumstances are het326. See supra note 14.
327. See supra note 15.
328. Cf. Robert Baldwin & Julia Black, Really Responsive Regulation, 71
MOD. L. REV. 59, 59 (2008) (discussing the difficulties inherent in regulatory
response).
329. Id. (emphasizing that consideration of a regulatory approach must
begin by asking “whether it offers assistance in addressing the challenges regulators face in practice”).
330. See Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 12, at 691–92.
331. See id. at 694.
332. See id.
333. Cf. PAUL KRUGMAN ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMICS 271–73 (2d ed.
2010) (describing Pigouvian taxes).
334. See Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 12, at 705.
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erogeneous because they avoid frictions involved when TBR
335
tools impose uniform, one-size-fits-all technologies. That said,
in order for PBR tools to function the regulator must be able to
monitor outputs in order to calibrate regulatory response in a
valid manner; without easily monitored outputs, PBR tools will
336
not work.
To Coglianese and Lazer, the TBR-PBR dichotomy therefore provides no guidance to policymakers where the market is
at once characterized by heterogeneous market actors and diffi337
cult-to-monitor regulatory outputs. Their solution is to propose management-based regulation (MBR) as a third model of
338
regulatory mechanism design. MBR describes when regulators direct market actors to engage in a planning process that
339
aims to achieve public goals. Market actors enjoy the freedom
to fashion solutions to problems in ways that are sensitive to
340
their local circumstances. The regulatory intervention occurs
at the planning stage, with regulators helping and overseeing
firms as they deliberate on how to best promote regulatory ob341
jectives. It offers the decentralized context-specificity of PBR
342
without relying on precise measurements of outputs. Where
policymakers have largely abandoned structural regulation and
the regulated market is subject to endemic complexity, MBR is
343
a naturally attractive approach.
The idea of MBR resonates with many other theoretical
orientations to administrative law and practice, including—to
344
345
name a few—meta risk management, new governance, ex335. See id. at 725 (emphasizing the “flexibility” or performance-based regulation).
336. See id.
337. See id. at 705.
338. See id. at 725–26.
339. See id. at 694.
340. Cf. id. at 726 (“Management-based regulation may be the best available regulatory approach for problems that require fine-grained analysis of local circumstances.”).
341. See id. at 694, 706.
342. See id. at 692.
343. Cf. id. at 702 (noting that MBR can be particularly important “especially with respect to problems that arise from breakdowns in complex systems
or that require coordination among a large number of interactive human and
technological processes”).
344. Cf. John Braithwaite, Meta Risk Management and Responsive Regulation for Tax System Integrity, 25 LAW & POL’Y 1, 1–2 (2003) (introducing meta
risk management as the concept of assessing or regulating the risk management practices of corporations).
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347

perimental governance, enforced self-regulation, contextu348
349
alizing regimes,
collaborative governance,
and meta350
regulation. It is not merely the TBR/PBR dichotomy that is at
risk; the administrative state as traditionally conceived is contested, as governance is pushed down and throughout what
used to be termed the private sector. Rather than mandating
specific procedures or outcomes, public power is used to influence the “attitudinal settings” of regulated firms that determine how they process, produce, deliberate on, and react to in351
formation.
Policymakers seek to regulate the exercise of
judgment—in the context of risk management, they engage in
meta-risk management, or the risk management of risk man352
agement.
345. Cf. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 343–44
(2004) (discussing the “paradigm shift from a regulatory to a governance model”); David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance & Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L.
539, 541 (2006) (“These processes, which we will collectively label ‘new governance’, may encourage experimentation; employ stakeholder participation to
devise solutions; rely on broad framework agreements, flexible norms and revisable standards; and use benchmarks, indicators and peer review to ensure
accountability.”).
346. Cf. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 288 (1998) (discussing experimental
governance at local levels); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism
and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 55 (2011)
(“In experimentalist regimes, central institutions give autonomy to local ones
to pursue generally declared goals.”).
347. Cf. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 102–
03 (1992) (discussing enforced self-regulation as “negotiations between state
and individual firms that result in flexible, particularistic standards and enforcement”).
348. Cf. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Contextualizing Regimes:
Institutionalization as a Response to the Limits of Interpretation and Policy
Engineering, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1265, 1266 (2012) (“[I]nstead of making the
decision directly, the officials charged with decisionmaking adopt the normative output of one or more specialized bodies of stakeholders.”).
349. Cf. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative
State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 22 (1997) (discussing general features of collaborative governance, such as flexibility and interdependency).
350. Cf. PARKER, supra note 10, at 245–91 (discussing the regulation of
corporate decision making).
351. See Baldwin & Black, supra note 328, at 68–70; David Hess & Cristie
L. Ford, Corporate Corruption and Reform Undertakings: A New Approach to
an Old Problem, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 307, 327–29 (2008).
352. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and
Regulation in a Digital Age, 88 TEX. L. REV. 669, 681 (2010); Braithwaite, supra note 344, at 2–3.
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But what does it mean to re-focus the regulatory lens on
the planning processes instead of specific technologies (as with
TBR) or mandated outcomes (as with PBR)? On the one hand,
this new focus on the planning stage could take the form of a
one-step verification of corporate processes. On the other hand,
it could focus on continuous learning, benchmarking, and iden353
tifying best practices on a rolling basis. This latter model of
MBR regulation draws from “experimentalist” theories of governance that are influenced by the pragmatist precept of the
354
reciprocal determination of ends and means. The ends of financial stability and safety and soundness are impacted by the
means by which risk managers and executives implement corporate risk governance systems. As such, solutions to regulatory problems must be seen as provisional rather than static.
Regulatory action should be “conversational” in nature and responsive not only to changing markets but also to the institutional and functional contexts within which regulation oc355
curs. To a large degree, the choice between viewing MBR as
process verification or as continuous learning represents the
choice between assurance-oriented stress testing and deliberation-oriented stress testing. And, for the same reasons applicable in that context, continuous learning is preferable to periodic
356
verification.
Another concern to bear in mind is that opening up regulation to participation by regulated firms presents the risk of a
357
legitimacy deficit.
Whereas traditional administrative law
provides for ample private sector participation, such participation is channeled through a pluralistic notice-and-comment
358
process. By contrast, an experimentalist MBR approach to
regulation is both too decentralized and too provisional to permit a formal notice-and-comment process involving all affected
stakeholders, including users of credit, providers of credit (particularly depositors and money market investors), and even
353. William H. Simon compares this sort of legal-regulatory regime to
Toyota’s highly flexible, nonhierarchical production system—and in particular
its commitment to having zero tolerance to failure and its ability to adapt to
changing circumstances. See William H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal
Theory and Rolling Rule Regimes, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU
AND THE US 37, 44–45 (Gráinne de Burca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006).
354. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 346, at 284–87.
355. See JULIA BLACK, RULES AND REGULATORS 37–44 (1997).
356. See supra Part III.B.
357. See Weber, supra note 227, at 850–52.
358. See Freeman, supra note 349, at 11–12.
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taxpayers in their capacity as the ultimate providers of gov359
ernment guarantees. Instead, a better prototype is the frequent and informal regulator-regulatee interaction of the bank
examination. Because the bank examination occurs outside the
gaze of the public, care must be given to ensure that MBR initiatives such as deliberation-oriented stress testing are not captured by industry on account of its privileged access to regula360
tors and role as information-provider.
Direct stakeholder participation may very well prove unworkable in this context. Nevertheless, although MBR necessarily entails extensive involvement of industry actors in planning regulation, the legitimacy deficit is not a structural,
endemic problem. It is at least theoretically possible for an internal industrial morality—which Neil Gunningham and Joseph Rees define as “an industry-wide normative framework, a
set of industrial principles and practices that defines right conduct as it spells out the industry’s public commitment to moral
361
restraint and aspiration” —to attenuate these concerns. MBR
is therefore not only about innovating the regulatory toolkit by
changing the instruments of regulators; it also relies to some
extent on altering the objectives of regulated firms. Philip Selznick makes this point:
If an organization has a well-developed internal morality—driven
by the quest for excellence, sustained by the interplay of means and
ends—the community’s strategy may well shift from external to internal control. Instead of demanding conformity to standards imposed by
legislation and regulation, we may place greater reliance on moral
development. In this way, the internal morality of an institution be362
comes a resource for public policy.

The introduction of morality into the discussion both complicates and facilitates MBR regulatory programs. It facilitates
a program to the extent that it offers a way to fill the legitimacy gap. But it complicates a program to the extent it delimits
359. Cf. id. at 83 (“[P]ursuit of collaboration requires efforts to transcend
the familiar debates over controlling agency discretion and depends upon a
willingness to experiment with nontraditional forms of accountability.”).
360. See Weber, supra note 227, at 850–54.
361. Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective, 19 LAW & POL’Y 363, 376 (1997); see also PARKER, supra
note 10, at 295–97 (stating that harnessing industrial morality for public regulatory objectives depends in part on good relations with corporate stakeholders, bolstered by an “open system” dialogue with them).
362. PHILIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH 327 (1992). Selznick’s
use of “internal morality” is similar to Gunningham and Rees’s use of “industrial morality.” Compare id., with Gunningham & Rees, supra note 361, at
376.
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the range of possible subjects for which the MBR regulatory
program will work. An MBR approach to stress testing that
seeks to foster increased mindfulness of stress and failure will
only achieve regulatory objectives for those institutions that
are willing to deliberate meaningfully on stress and failure. A
precondition to an effective MBR regulatory initiative is therefore the development of an industrial morality, a process calling
to mind to what Christine Parker refers to as the “institutional363
ization of responsibility.” The next section takes up the question of what an appropriate industrial morality for deliberationoriented stress testing might look like.
B. AN INDUSTRIAL MORALITY OF QUANTITATIVE SKEPTICISM
The regulation of deliberation-oriented stress testing is, at
bottom, about influencing the moral character of financial institutions so that they maintain capital at levels sufficient to en364
sure resilient performance during periods of stress. Such an
orientation recognizes that risk management techniques will
only work if attention is paid to the organizational environment
365
within which they operate. But what does it mean to speak of
an institution’s character? Selznick’s discussion of institutional
character is instructive:
As applied to institutions, “character” is a broader idea than “culture.” Culture is the symbolic expression of shared perception, valuation, and belief. Therefore the idea of “organizational culture” properly emphasizes the creation of common understandings regarding
purpose and policy. The character of an organization includes its culture, but something more as well. A pattern of dependency—for example, on a specific labor force, a market, or particular suppliers—
363. See PARKER, supra note 10, at 61 (“The success of corporate regulation
depends crucially on a corporation’s ability to institutionalize responsibility.”).
364. See GRP. OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 43 (2009) (“Regulators will need to encourage banks to internalize [the] discipline [of maintaining adequate capitalization during expansion periods] by requiring capital management policies to be tied to careful
analysis of what stress scenarios imply about capital needs.”).
365. See C.F. LARRY HEIMANN, ACCEPTABLE RISKS 1 (1997) (“[O]rganizational and technological failures have become intimately linked so that to
fully understand the cause of most major accidents, we must analyze both the
administrative and technical aspects of the situation.”); PARKER, supra note
10, at 83 (“[T]o get at behaviour within the organization means changing the
balance of external influences vying for management attention, so that social
and legal responsibilities get a higher priority.”); DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION 67 (1996) (“Decision making in organizations is always affected by how information is sent and received, the characteristics of
that information, and how it is interpreted by the individuals who send and
receive it.”).
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may have little to do with symbolism or belief. The character of a
company or a trade union owes much to the structure of the industry,
the skills of employees or members, the alliances that can be fashioned, and many other practical limits and opportunities. Attitudes
and beliefs account for only part of an organization’s distinctive character.
. . . “Character” refers to the commitments that help to determine the
kinds of tasks an organization takes on, the opportunities it creates or
closes off, the priorities it sets, and the abuses to which it is prone. . . .
We cannot presume that every organization has a definite character.
When one does, however, we can usually identify premises that fix,
for substantial periods, the association’s operative goals and charac366
teristic methods.

A key aspect of the corporate governance of financial
firms—using this term broadly to include not only legal documents and roles but also attitudinal settings, discursive practices, unspoken norms, and patterns of social influence within
firms—is the degree of attention that firm managers devote to
367
deliberating on the possibilities of stress and failure. Managerial attention to these matters is determined in large part by
patterns of social influence and the “intentional and uninten368
tional usage of language to frame [issues]” within firms. These corporate governance systems are heterogeneous and subject
369
to constant change. Some of these systems accommodate a
meaningful deliberation on stress and failure better than others. With MBR, these systems become a proper subject for
regulatory influence and control as the main structural pillar of
an attempt to shape institutional character and industrial morality.
Once this point is admitted, then the logic of MBR emerges
in clearer relief. One of the principal virtues of MBR is that it
facilitates learning by regulators, who are able to intervene in
that planning stage to identify the best practices of highperforming firms and present those practices prospectively as
370
standards to lower-performing firms. It connects administrative law and regulation directly to the learning that occurs on

366. SELZNICK, supra note 362, at 321–22.
367. Cf. POWER, supra note 168, at 10 (arguing that corporate governance
norms themselves are “a risk management strategy for a distinctive kind of
risk—the failure of senior management to prevent risk incubation”).
368. See Jane E. Dutton, Strategic Agenda Building in Organizations, in
ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING 81, 89–90 (Zur Shapira ed., 1997).
369. Cf. id. at 86–99 (discussing the various intersecting forces that can
affect agenda-setting by corporate decision makers).
370. See supra note 353 and accompanying text.
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371

the ground at the industry level. Again, the pragmatist influ372
ence is apparent. Deliberation-oriented stress testing regulatory programs should be conceptualized as efforts to shape industrial morality, on a rolling basis, by encouraging firms to
continuously evolve and improve the way they produce and
process information concerning the risk of stress and failure. In
this way, the extent of the corporate deliberation on safety and
failure is no longer determined by any fixed statutory or regulatory standard and is instead set by a dynamic and dialogic interaction between industry and regulators over what are the
373
best standards of failure awareness. Andrew Haldane of the
Bank of England makes this point with regard to the regulation
of stress testing:
Having banks conduct regular evaluations of their positions relative
to a set of common scenarios (provided by the authorities) would be an
improvement on current practices in several respects. First, it would
allow some degree of benchmarking of results across institutions; second, it would allow a degree of benchmarking, and hence peer review, of models; and third, it would hopefully help in ensuring stresstesting exercises form an input to management decisions and are not
374
an annual regulatory ritual.

In this way, regulators can use information learned from
industry to direct supervisory resources in a risk-responsive
375
manner, focusing on bad actors and slow movers.

371. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 346, at 350–51.
372. See supra notes 353–54 and accompanying text.
373. Joseph Rees notes that, after Three Mile Island, nuclear power operators channeled their institutional resources away from compliance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission rules and toward achieving “standards of excellence.” See REES, supra note 14, at 1–2, 20–21.
374. Why Banks Failed the Stress Test, supra note 170, at 8 (emphasis
added). There is some evidence that regulators were aware of this benefit of
horizontal review, though their track record in harnessing the benefit has
been poor. See Lessons Learned in Risk Management Oversight at Federal Financial Regulators: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. of the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 14 (2009) (statement
of Roger T. Cole, Director, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) (“[T]here was a significant
opportunity to put pressure on the big firms to improve their ability to pull positions together on a firm-wide basis and develop a really robust stress
test. . . . We used that as a major tool in terms of pushing on those firms. It
was feedback from that exercise and saying, look, you need to do more here,
and that is one of the main tools that we have, is that type of horizontal review.”).
375. Cf. Robert Baldwin & Julia Black, Really Responsive Risk-Based Regulation, 32 LAW & POL’Y 181, 181 (2010) (“These are collections of strategies
that, at the very least, involve the targeting of enforcement resources on the
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There is a further, somewhat counterintuitive, advantage
of these rolling best practices regimes: they also create economic incentives for those firms with institutional characters predisposed to promote regulatory objectives to innovate their
practices. If, for instance, Bank of Prudence communicates to
regulators a new stress test that, for the first time, takes seriously the possible linkages between leveraged loans and repo
funding ability, regulators might insist that Bank of Hazard
and other less mindful banks conduct the same test and consider the results’ implications. Bank of Prudence indirectly initiates a conversation between the bank regulator and Bank of
Hazard concerning risks that the latter might have been avoiding altogether, perhaps in the process taking market share
away from Bank of Prudence and even contributing to systemic
376
risk in the financial system.
In performing this exercise, regulators are not working
from a tabula rasa. Financial firms already have distinctive institutional characters within their risk management departments, upper echelons of management, and boards of directors.
’Mikes’ field research into risk management practices at large
financial firms, discussed above in Part II.B, is relevant here.
She found that two prevailing “calculative cultures” predominate within financial firm risk management departments:
377
quantitative enthusiasm and quantitative skepticism. Quantitative skeptics consider risk measurements as trend indicators to be taken into consideration alongside qualitative criteria
378
such as “managerial discretion, experience and judgment.”
They use quantitative models as “learning tool[s]” in multifactor judgment processes rather than as an “answering ma379
chine.” For them, “risk control is akin to a devil’s advocate
system, to be mobilized in order to challenge taken-for-granted
380
assumptions and foster organizational learning.”
Mikes found further that the salience of the role of risk
management in firm corporate governance depended in large
part on the extent to which risk managers aligned their technical capabilities with the predominant calculative culture
basis of assessments of the risks that a regulated person or firm poses to the
regulator’s objectives.”).
376. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 346, at 350–51.
377. Mikes, supra note 56, at 22.
378. Mikes, supra note 57, at 15.
379. See Mikes, supra note 56, at 35–36.
380. Id. at 22.

2312

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:2236

381

within their respective firms.
In quantitatively skeptical
firms, risk management personnel exert greater influence over
382
agenda setting and key strategic decision making. Such firms
conceptualize “risk” in broad enough terms to include not simply measureable uncertainty but any threatening event irrespec383
tive of its ability to be measured. Because they had information—albeit at times non-quantifiable information—
concerning such risks that senior management valued, risk
384
managers were expected to discuss them. On the other hand,
in quantitatively enthusiastic firms, risk managers were unable to impact big-picture strategy but were able to marshal
quantitative risk estimates to influence already-existing de385
bates about how to allocate capital in the firm. Quantitatively
enthusiastic management demands quantifiable risk estimates
as the key building blocks of an “economic capital” managerial
system that adjusts the profitability of business lines according
386
to the risks they posed. Senior management instructs risk
managers to quantify risk so as to “induce correct economic be387
haviour” in light of the firm’s goals.
From the perspective of stress test planning, not all calculative cultures are equal. There are several reasons why deliberation-oriented stress testing is more likely to flourish in
quantitatively skeptical risk management departments. The
first reason flows from the conceptual roots of stress testing in
388
the study of failure. A firm’s orientation to failure is necessarily a strategic issue. On account of the correlation between
quantitative skepticism and risk managers’ participation in
strategic decision making, regulators should encourage quantitative skepticism. That is to say, risk managers, who are responsible for conceiving of and implementing stress testing
programs, will have access to board-level attention. A second,
but related, reason flows from the fact that deliberationoriented stress testing requires an encounter with non381. Id. at 37. Mikes builds on Anish Bhimani’s earlier work finding that
the perceived success of a management information system depends on
whether the cultural premise of a new system is aligned with the predilections
of the intended users of the new system approach. Id. at 21.
382. Id. at 28.
383. Id. at 35.
384. Id. at 29.
385. Id. at 34.
386. Id. at 24, 32.
387. Id. at 31.
388. See supra Part I.A.
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quantifiable uncertainty that quantitative skeptics are better
positioned to perform. A third reason is that by demanding precise calculation outputs, quantitative enthusiasts are inclined
to orient towards assurance-oriented stress testing and furthermore make unavailable several of the types of stress testing exercises highlighted above, such as war games and reverse
stress tests.
C. HIGH-RELIABILITY ORGANIZATIONS: REGULATORS ALREADY
HAVE PROTOTYPES AND NEED NOT CREATE ANYTHING NEW
In using MBR to foster the quantitative skepticism conducive to deliberation-oriented stress testing, regulators have
other institutional models from which to draw. In particular,
management researchers have identified a category of so called
“high reliability organizations” (HROs) that are characterized
by their aspiration of complete failure avoidance and their
commitment to resilient performance in conditions of uncer389
tainty and stress. Since an MBR regulatory program to encourage deliberation-oriented stress testing touches directly on
the concept of failure, the relevance of HROs in this context is
readily apparent. Remember that the conceptual roots of stress
testing and stress analysis are found in the search to better
understand the network of causes out of which failure might
result. In fact, we have already seen how one branch of engineering—systems reliability analysis—expressly directs itself
390
to the concept of reliability. In the brief description of HROs
that follows, bear in mind how HROs focus on the causes of
failure.
Examples of HROs include nuclear power plants, aircraft
carriers, wildfire-fighting crews, disease control authorities,
391
and air traffic control systems. The decisional infrastructures
of these organizations prize reliable performance because failure—e.g., a nuclear power plant meltdown or a mid-air collision
of commercial jetliners—is catastrophic from the perspective of
392
managers. Financial regulators therefore would do well to
393
look to the institutional character-morality of HROs.
389. See Rijpma, supra note 14, at 39.
390. See supra Part I.B.
391. WEICK & SUTCLIFFE, supra note 14, at ix.
392. See id. at ix–x.
393. It might be objected that the analogy to financial institutions is not
complete because the tolerance of failure for financial institutions in general is
low but not zero. Making banks completely failsafe would also ensure that the
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Kathleen Sutcliffe and Karl Weick individuate the following five attributes of HROs: (1) they are preoccupied with the
possibility of failure; (2) they are reluctant to accept simple explanations; (3) they maintain sensitivity to actual conditions of
operations; (4) they are committed to resilient performance that
maintains dynamic stability even in the presence of continuous
stress; and (5) they are non-hierarchical and defer to expertise
394
wherever it is located. The authors label the first three attributes “principles of anticipation” and the latter two attrib395
utes “principles of containment.”
The three principles of anticipation are relevant to deliberation-oriented stress testing because stress analysis is at bottom a diagnostic tool—it identifies rather than fixes prob396
lems.
Recall that risk management is about identifying
threats to desired objectives and taking steps to control them;
397
stress testing is only concerned with the former task. Sutcliffe and Weick discuss anticipation in terms with which scenario analysts at banks would be well familiar: “To anticipate
is to foresee or imagine an eventual unchecked outcome, based
on small disparities [between observations and expecta398
tions].” They further use the concept of mindfulness to illustrate how these principles contribute to the distinctive institutional character of HROs:
Mindfulness . . . involves the combination of ongoing scrutiny of existing expectations, continuous refinement and differentiation of expectations based on newer experiences, willingness and capability to invent new expectations that make sense of unprecedented events, a
more nuanced appreciation of context and ways to deal with it, and
identification of new dimensions of context that improve foresight and
current functioning. . . . Mindfulness is focused on clear and detailed
banks would be of little use to savers and borrowers. Cf. COUNTERPARTY RM
GROUP REPORT, supra note 180, at 11 (“[S]tress tests, when combined with
carefully constructed scenario analyses, can be helpful, but even under the
best of circumstances, stress tests can never anticipate how future events will
unfold unless such tests are so extreme as to postulate outcomes that no level
of capital or liquidity will provide protections against potential failure.”). A
privatized system of finance necessarily entails that financial institutions engage in risk-taking and therefore will be subject to some non-trivial possibility
of failure. Nevertheless, policymakers’ failure tolerance approaches zero for
systemically significant financial institutions whose failure could cause the
core functions of the financial system to collapse.
394. See WEICK & SUTCLIFFE, supra note 14, at 8–17 (discussing the attributes of HROs).
395. See id. at 63–64, 81–82.
396. See id. at 63–64 (summarizing the anticipation principles).
397. See supra notes 47–58 and accompanying text.
398. WEICK & SUTCLIFFE, supra note 14, at 45.
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comprehension of emerging threats and on factors that interfere with
such comprehension. Small failures have to be noticed (the principle
of preoccupation with failure), and their distinctiveness must be retained rather than lost in a category (reluctance to simplify). People
need to remain aware of ongoing operations if they want to notice nu399
ances that could be symptoms of failure (sensitivity to operations).

As discussed at length above, risk management departments use VaR techniques and stress tests to form expectations
400
about risk, loss, and failure in an uncertain economic future.
These expectations about risk largely determine how capital is
allocated throughout the corporate group and also contribute to
401
strategic agenda setting. But Sutcliffe and Weick note that
expectations are a “mixed blessing” because they create “blind
spots,” by which they mean “belated recognition of unexpected,
402
threatening events.”
They note further that our ability to update our expectations in light of new information is frustrated by the “disqualification heuristic,” which describes our tendency to disqualify
disconfirming information, highlight confirming information,
403
and neglect information that contradicts convictions.
The
disqualification heuristic is related to the so-called “overconfi404
dence bias,” “hindsight bias,” and “outcome bias.” The overconfidence bias describes our tendency to have inflated subjec405
tive perceptions of correctness. The hindsight bias refers to
our tendency to overestimate the amount of information we
406
deem relevant at the time we made a decision. The outcome
bias describes our demonstrated tendency to evaluate events in
407
ways that are anchored on observed outcomes. These deci399. See id. at 32–33.
400. See supra Part II.B.
401. See supra notes 381–87 and accompanying text.
402. WEICK & SUTCLIFFE, supra note 14, at 23.
403. See Lee Clarke, The Disqualification Heuristic: When Do Organizations Misperceive Risk?, 5 RES. SOC. PROBLEMS & PUB. POL’Y 289 (1993).
404. Cf. id. at 299–301 (discussing how the disqualification heuristic leads
to biased risk assessment).
405. See Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Calibration of Probabilities: The State of
the Art to 1980, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES
306, 314 (Daniel Kahneman et al, eds., 1982) (“The most pervasive finding in
recent research is that people are overconfident with general-knowledge items
of moderate or extreme difficulty.”).
406. See Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome
Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
HUMAN PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288 (1975).
407. See Jonathan Baron & John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in Decision
Evaluation, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 569, 569 (1988).
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sional pathologies have obvious negative effects on institutional
learning with the familiar result that key corporate decision
makers overlook accumulating evidence of anomalies, overestimate the validity of their expectations, and even struggle to
distinguish narrowly-avoided catastrophe from outright suc408
cesses. Barry Turner and’ Nick Pidgeon’s “disaster incubation
theory” formalizes these decisional pathologies and shortcuts
into an organizational theory: weak signals of disaster are ignored during a latent phase of “disaster incubation” before
409
pushing systems into disaster modes.
These decisional phenomena explain our demonstrated
tendencies to normalize unanticipated deviations from our expectations—even when they may be weak signals of impending
catastrophe. HROs counteract this tendency by seeking instead
410
to continuously problematize and anomalize the unexpected.
For instance, the military and U.S. intelligence community use
408. See WEICK & SUTCLIFFE, supra note 14, at 26.
409. See BARRY A. TURNER & NICK F. PIDGEON, MAN-MADE DISASTERS (2d
ed. 1997). Other researchers of disasters and failures object that any systematic effort to discover weak signals of impending failure is bound to fail for complex systems such as the financial system, and its constitutive institutions and
their portfolios. See, e.g., CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH
HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES 4–5 (2d ed. 1999) (suggesting failure is inevitable
in most complex systems); Weber, supra note 10, at 665–704 (explaining why
the financial system is complex in light of, among other things, Perrow’s normal accident theory). To these theorists, every complex system already carries
the seeds of a failure—or, to use Perrow’s phrase, a “normal accident”—that
will come to pass in a manner that defies ex ante prediction. See PERROW, supra at 4–5 (discussing the unpredictability of failures in complex systems). The
events that HRO theorists point out as harbingers of disaster are only signals
in hindsight. See id. Notwithstanding the emphasis on HROs in this Section,
this Article avoids weighing in on either side of that debate. I have argued
elsewhere that the financial system is in fact vulnerable to normal accidents
and that the most effective way to counteract those vulnerabilities is to embark on structural reform of the sector. See Weber, supra note 10, at 710 (suggesting structural reforms). Instead, the Article undertakes an analysis of the
uses to which stress testing may be put and makes recommendations for their
implementation as a regulatory matter. In other words, it argues that deliberation-oriented stress testing is more likely to be successful if regulators encourage firms to adopt it as a method inspired by HROs; it stops well short,
however, of presenting deliberation-oriented stress testing as a panacea for
financial instability.
410. See WEICK & SUTCLIFFE, supra note 14, at 41–42. A related discipline
of near-miss incident management attempts to design a systematic program
for recognizing near-misses as signs of operational failure and learning from
them. See James R. Phimister et al., Near-Miss Incident Management in the
Chemical Process Industry, 23 RISK ANALYSIS 445, 446–47 (2003) (proposing a
framework consisting of identification, reporting, prioritization/distribution,
causal analysis, solution identification, dissemination, and resolution).
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a so-called “red team” in operations planning to do just that.
The red team is responsible for playing devil’s advocate during
planning sessions, directly challenging conventional wisdom
and existing plans, using “what if” types of questions to find
412
flaws in decisions, forecast, or intelligence information. In
other words, they do the opposite of what Admiral Ugaki did in
the war games leading up to the Battle of Midway, with cata413
strophic results for the Japanese fleet.
Other frequent reference points in the HRO literature are
the linkages between the institutional character of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the highprofile failures of the Challenger and Columbia space shut414
tles. The post-accident commissions charged with investigating the disasters framed their reports as answering nearly
identical queries: why did NASA go ahead with the launches
despite knowledge of serious problems and despite concerns of
415
engineers? In other words, what inhibited NASA from learning about failure from the accumulation of weak signals of
stress? This is an inquiry into how NASA’s institutional character lacked an appropriate commitment to mindfulness of the
416
risks of failure.
Diane Vaughan’s study of the 1986 Challenger disaster
highlights how NASA failed to learn from weak signals of the
problem that ultimately resulted in the shuttle’s catastrophic
417
failure. The immediate cause of the explosion was a faulty
design in the O-ring that sealed the joints of the solid rocket

411. See BREMMER & KEAT, supra note 123, at 25.
412. See id.
413. See supra note 133 and accompanying text for a discussion of how
Ugaki introduced bias into the results of the game, thereby reducing its information value.
414. See generally VAUGHAN, supra note 365 (discussing the institutions at
NASA and the space shuttle disasters).
415. See COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BD., REPORT VOLUME I, at
195 (2003), available at http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/home/CAIB_Vol1.html
[hereinafter COLUMBIA REPORT] (also discussing the Challenger commission
report).
416. Id. at 177 (“Many accident investigations make the same mistake in
defining causes. They identify the widget that broke or malfunctioned, then
locate the person most closely connected with the technical failure . . . . When
causal chains are limited to technical flaws and individual failures, the ensuing responses aimed at preventing a similar event in the future are equally
limited . . . .”).
417. See VAUGHAN, supra note 365, at 124–43 (discussing the events leading up to the challenger explosion).
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418

boosters. The O-rings allowed leakage of hot propellant gas to
breach the joint and eventually ignite the liquid hydrogen and
419
oxygen in the external fuel tank. Vaughan’s study finds that
evidence of the design errors had been discovered during test
flights, discussed, and reported on by NASA contractor working
420
groups. In their institutional response to this information,
the working groups “normalized” the deviance of the experience
421
from their expectations.
By normalization of deviance
Vaughan refers to the process by which “behavior the work
group first identified as technical deviation was subsequently
reinterpreted as within the norm for acceptable joint perfor422
mance, then finally officially labeled an acceptable risk.”
A similar normalization of deviance occurred in the lead-up
to the disastrous 2003 Columbia shuttle mission. The technical
cause of the loss of Columbia and its crew was a breach in the
so-called “Thermal Protection System” on the leading edge of
the left wing, caused by a piece of insulating foam that had
separated from an external fuel tank shortly after launch and
423
struck the shuttle’s wing.
During re-entry this breach in the Thermal Protection System “allowed superheated air to penetrate through the leading edge insulation and progressively melt the aluminum structure of the left wing,
resulting in a weakening of the structure until increasing aerodynamic forces caused loss of control, failure of the wing, and breakup of the
424
[shuttle].”

Foam-shedding had occurred repeatedly in NASA space
shuttle losses, and had been consistently labeled an “In-Flight
Anomaly,” which required a specific NASA organization to resolve the problem or convince NASA that it did not pose a
425
threat to the crew. NASA managers would then remove the
designation as corrective measures were taken, but the prob426
lem kept recurring. When a major foam-shedding event took
418. Id. at xi.
419. Id.
420. See id. at 119–25 (discussing NASA’s work groups).
421. Id. at 65.
422. Id. Vaughan identifies a recurring five-stage process in the work
group’s processing of information about erosion of the O-ring: (1) signals of potential danger; (2) official act acknowledging escalated risk; (3) review of evidence; (4) official act indicating the normalization of deviance: accepting risk;
and (5) shuttle launch. Id.
423. COLUMBIA REPORT, supra note 415, at 9.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 123.
426. Id. at 196.
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place in 2002—a year before the fatal Columbia launch—NASA
427
managers downgraded it to the status of an “action item.”
The board charged with investigating the accident expressly
tied NASA’s institutional failures to those failures in the lead428
up to the earlier Challenger launch. The institutional similarities between the accidents are striking: “In all official engineering analyses and launch recommendations prior to the accidents, evidence that the design was not performing as
expected was reinterpreted as acceptable and non-deviant,
429
which diminished perceptions of risk throughout the agency.”
Robin Dillon and Catherine Tinsley use the Columbia tragedy as an illustration of a more general phenomenon concerning why weak signals of failure, which they term “near misses,”
are rarely treated as presages of future failure worthy of tar430
geted further inquiry. In their view, NASA managers processed the information of foam-shedding in a manner that ac431
tually decreased their awareness of risk. Consequently, that
lower sense of perceived risk encouraged future riskier choices—i.e., to continue with the shuttle launch despite further
432
revelations of risk. “Hence, “NASA managers contemporane433
ously accounted for, but failed to learn from, near-misses.” So
how is it possible that learning of weak signals of failure decreased rather than increased subjective risk perceptions? Dillon and Tinsley hypothesize that the explanation lies in the difference between propensities and dispositions.
The propensity of an event can be distinguished from its
disposition by reference to the concept of the “close counterfac427. Id.
428. See id. at 195 (drawing parallels between the explosions). Overall, the
2003 commission report’s description of NASA’s institutional character reads
like a tutorial on how not to be an HRO. It decries an unjustifiably optimistic
safety culture (i.e., no preoccupation with failure), id. at 180, consistent preferences for oversimplified explanations (i.e., no reluctance to simplify), id. at
181, and a rigid and hierarchical organizational structure within the mission
management team that impeded the communication of information (i.e., no
deference to expertise). Id. at 192 (discussing experts’ reluctance to speak).
429. Id. at 196.
430. See Dillon & Tinsley, supra note 11, at 1425–26 (discussing the treatment of near misses).
431. Id. at 1426.
432. Id.; see Matthew N. McMullen & Keith D. Markman, Downward
Counterfactuals and Motivation: The Wake-Up Call and the Pangloss Effect,
26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 575, 581–83 (2000) (describing this
phenomenon as the “Pangloss effect”).
433. Dillon & Tinsley, supra note 11, at 1426.
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434

tual.” A close counterfactual exists where a subject affirms
that the counterfactual outcome “almost” occurred—instead of
merely affirming the counterfactual outcome “could have” oc435
curred. Disposition refers to the subjectively understood statistical probability of an event occurring based on prior rate in436
formation. Propensity, by contrast, refers to the subjective
perception of probability supplemented by event cues that subjectively tie the counterfactual outcome causally to the actions
437
taken. To illustrate, consider the following scenario developed
by Daniel Kahneman and Carol Varey to illustrate this point:
“At the end of a long game of chance, John could have won the
whole pot if a die that he rolled showed a six. The die that he
rolled was loaded to show six 80% of the time. John rolled it
438
and it showed a two.“ When research subjects were prompted
with subjects the close counterfactual “The die almost rolled a
439
six,” they rejected it decisively. However, they largely accept440
ed the close counterfactual “John almost won the whole pot.”
The results show how subjective understanding of probability
depends in part on information that does not impact objective
probability at all. The key factor is whether event cues situate
441
the information according to a causal script.
Dillon and Tinsley apply the insight into the risk discussion by inquiring into how near-misses affect perceptions of
442
risk. Near-misses can prompt either serious deliberation and
updated probability assessments or they can be celebrated as
evidence corroborating the robustness and safety of the existing
443
state of affairs. The researchers found strong support for the
434. See Daniel Kahneman & Carol A. Varey, Propensities and Counterfactuals: The Loser That Almost Won, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1101,
1101 (1990).
435. Id.
436. Id. at 1102.
437. See id. at 1104–05 (distinguishing close counterfactuals from propensities).
438. Id. at 1104.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. See id. Two key factors impacting the existence of event cues are proximity and decisiveness. See id. at 1106–07.
442. Dillon & Tinsley, supra note 11, at 1430.
443. See Dillon & Tinsley, supra note 11, at 1430; Adam J. Hirsch & Gregory Mitchell, Law and Proximity, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 557, 569–70 (“In situations where assimilation [of the close call to the narrowly-avoided bad outcome] is likely to induce fright, a close call . . . acts as a ‘wake up call.’ But, in
those instances where it instead prompts contrast, and so induces relief, a
close call can cause complacency and thus impair learning.”).
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hypothesis that near-misses are interpreted in a favorable
444
light, decrease perceived risk, and encourage risky behavior.
They conjecture that the increased risk tolerance is due to the
absence of event cues connecting the near-miss to proximal
445
failure. People adjust downward their subjective perceptions
of risk as they weave a causal script linking the near-miss to
446
non-failure rather than to failure.
The Dillon-Tinsley results are worrisome from the perspective of financial regulators. They also enhance the case for HRO
principles. Given the highly competitive environment in which
modern financial institutions operate, the tendency to normalize deviant events (i.e., weak signals of failure such as localized
pockets of increasing loan delinquency or market rumors of liquidity concerns) results in a failure to relate the event to a
causal script involving the possibility of failure. It is easy to
imagine how this plays out in the construction of VaR models,
sensitivity analysis, and stress scenarios: in the relative quiescence of present market conditions, market anomalies are normalized or, worse still, interpreted as signs of the robustness of
the same quiescent conditions. This is a familiar story of how—
despite the enormous resources devoted to developing the “sophisticated” risk management systems—clusters of weak signals of impending catastrophe become blind spots and go unheeded by risk managers, executives, and directors.
One of the central challenges in implementing an effective
deliberation-oriented stress testing regime is therefore how to
problematize deviations from expectations so as to enable them
to, among other things, more readily construct causal scripts
leading to failure. The commission that investigated the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks impliedly invoked HRO principles in a discussion of how to prevent catastrophic attacks on
major domestic infrastructure, insisting that governmental
agencies “routiniz[e], even bureaucratiz[e], the exercise of im447
agination.”

444. See Dillon & Tinsley, supra note 11, at 1431–36.
445. Id. at 1431.
446. See id. at 1433–34.
447. 9-11 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 16, at 344. One commissioner clarified that “you don't really institutionalize imagination” so much as “you put in
place systems that allow the imagination that’s naturally occurring to actually
break through.” Jena McGregor, The Gospels of Failure, FAST COMPANY,
http://www.fastcompany.com/52512/gospels-failure (last visited Apr. 21, 2014)
(quoting Jamie Gorelick).
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But what sort of imagination concerning stress should be
encouraged? Research into the psychology of proximity has
demonstrated that proximity is a decisive factor in determining
how an event is processed: “as proximity to calamity or success
increases, the likelihood of strong reactions to the ultimate outcome increases, counterfactual dwelling on ways the outcome
could have been altered increases, and behavioral changes are
more likely to follow, especially with respect to potentially re448
peatable outcomes.”
Conceptually, deliberation-oriented stress testing should
have greater success in achieving financial stability where risk
managers experience failure as a psychologically proximate
event. But that is just to re-state the problem: the key question
from an MBR perspective is how to encourage such associations. Mindful HROs provide examples to which financial firms,
prodded by regulators, should aspire.
One small note is in order concerning a large problem: that
of incentives. So far, this discussion of HROs has elided considerations of economic motivations to cut expenses and grow revenue: devoting resources to the three principles of anticipation—attentiveness to weak signals of disaster as harbingers of
failure, skepticism with respect to expectations and rules of
thumb, and reluctance to simplify—is costly. The sort of mindful operations and planning culture that pervades HROs undercuts the usefulness of heuristics and routines that usually
do the job right and save time and resources. Even more importantly, allowing for mindfulness and the principles of anticipation to control capital allocation in a diversified financial
conglomerate is costly, especially considering the intense competition in the industry.
It should be noted that most of the organizations highlighted by the HRO literature are governmental units or utili449
ties that receive some protection from market competition.
And even with these entities, HRO management does not arise
naturally. Rees has observed that only when the nuclear power
448. Hirsch & Mitchell, supra note 443, at 570.
449. See supra note 394. One notable private sector HRO noted by Sutcliffe
and Weick is the courier FedEx’s Global Operations Control Unit, which manages a “sweep network” of FedEx airplanes. See WEICK & SUTCLIFFE, supra
note 14, at 70–71. Every evening, twenty or so FedEx airplanes leave their departure points only 60% full so as to permit them to re-route in order to pick
up unanticipated cargo and ensure that FedEx is able to meet its promised obligations without exceptions. Consequently, FedEx achieves added resiliency
by maintaining slack in its operations. Id.
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utilities realized in the aftermath of Three Mile Island incident
that their future viability depended on industry-wide reliability—that they were “hostages of each other”—did an industrial
morality develop to motivate a commitment to high reliabil450
ity. It should not surprise that purely private-sector HROs
are rare. One example of a private-sector, HRO-like operation
451
is the Toyota production system (TPS). This distinctive production system, long the subject of management studies, starts
from a set of shared commitments to trust, zero tolerance for
defects, continuous improvement (kaizen), and the indeterminate value of “quality” that is subject to continuous reevalua452
tion in light of new circumstances. In furtherance of these
commitments, TPS espouses decentralized and collaborative
decision making, deliberate destabilization of routines to facilitate learning, and a commitment to analyzing any failures to
453
their root causes. When an unexpected problem occurs on the
assembly line, workers have the power to pull the “andon cord”
that halts production at the entire plant so that the anomaly
454
can be examined and discussed.
Though the parallels to HRO principles are evident, recent
revelations of product defects and subsequent recalls call into
question the ability of Toyota, or any private industrial concern, to remain committed to such principles in the face of
455
pressures to cut costs and grow revenues and margins. These
private sector realities underscore the need for regulators to
take an active role not only in overseeing the scenarios, but also
shaping the industrial morality. This will necessarily entail

450. See generally REES, supra note 14 (discussing how nuclear industry
operations have changed since the Three Mile Island incident on account of
more effective self-regulation).
451. See Simon, supra note 353, at 45–47.
452. See id.
453. See id. at 45–55.
454. Id. at 45.
455. Current Toyota CEO Akio Toyoda has stated that market pressures
caused Toyota’s priorities to “bec[o]me confused,” leading Toyota to accelerate
production too quickly for company engineers to ensure quality commitment
as much of the work was outsourced to suppliers. See Alan Ohnsman et al.,
Toyota Recall Crisis Said to Lie in Cost Cuts, Growth Ambitions, BLOOMBERG,
Feb. 26, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=
aF0aX8t0Q6lk.
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heightened regulatory engagement during examinations with
456
both risk managers and senior executives.
All this is not to say that regulators should abandon the
use of MBR regulatory tools to foster deliberation-oriented
stress testing, but rather that in implementing such a program,
they should be willing to see cost-cutting and imprudent use of
leverage or expansion of revenue as part of the problem that
needs solving. The results of these tests can be taken into con457
sideration during the bank examination process. Although
this Article stops well short of advocating for regulatory allocation of credit, a shift towards a more hands-on engagement of
questions of risk assessment by regulators befits the regulation
of an industry that, like the utilities that historically have been
subject to regulatory price setting at the retail level, is responsible for key economic infrastructure without which the economy cannot properly function. It is time to take seriously the no458
tion of the utility function of financial institutions.
CONCLUSION
Although stress analysis is a parvenu in the bank regulatory regime, it has a long history in the engineering field from
as early as the sixteenth century. These early stress testing
methodologies evolved into professional norms on the part of
engineers to remain focused on worst-case scenarios when de456. Cf. Why Banks Failed the Stress Test, supra note 170, at 9 (“In the
arm-wrestle with management, it is about supplying power to the elbow of
risk-managers.”).
457. U.S. bank regulators subject large banks to a continuous supervision
regime. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK: LARGE BANK SUPERVISION 17–21 (2010) (explaining
that examination of large banks involves a periodic core assessment that culminates in a report from the OCC to the bank’s board of directors as well as
“various ongoing supervisory activities” and “targeted examinations”—i.e., integrated risk assessments by business or product line). Regulators usually rely
on “the use of reason and moral suasion” as their “primary corrective tools.”
FED. DEPOSIT. INS. CORP., RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES § 15.1 (2010). The use of these soft persuasive tactics occurs under the
shadow of bank regulators’ statutory powers (i) to order banks to remediate
unsafe or unsound practices uncovered during examinations backed by specified and open-ended enforcement authority and (ii) to issue cease-and-desist
orders with respect to unsafe or unsound practices. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(b),
1831o (2012) (outlining the powers of bank regulators).
458. See generally John Kay, Narrow Banking: The Reform of Banking
Regulation (Sept. 15, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www
.johnkay.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/JK-Narrow-Banking.pdf
(drawing
the parallels between the financial system and utilities).
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signing and building structures, materials, and systems. Financial firms have adopted an extensive suite of stress testing
techniques alongside their risk management systems. These
techniques represent the most direct encounter with the concept of failure by and among firm decision makers. Most of the
discussion regarding stress testing, however, focuses too much
on the mix of stress testing tools a firm uses and not enough on
the decisional infrastructure of, or orientation towards, stress
testing. While financial regulators and policymakers are right
to conceive of stress testing as a proper subject of regulation,
their conceptual understanding has lagged. In particular, their
efforts from the late 1980s until today have largely considered
stress tests as verification tools rather than as part of a deliberative, mindful institutional orientation towards failure- and
stress-related information within the corporate governance infrastructure of regulated firms. The success of stress testing
regulation will depend in large part on whether regulators shift
their focus towards this latter model.

